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Article
Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place:
A New Approach to Agency Deference
KEVIN O. LESKE
In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. the United States Supreme
Court held that federal courts must defer to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Astoundingly, despite its
doctrinal significance and practical importance to our administrative
state, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has gone largely unexamined
both by the legal community and by the Supreme Court, particularly when
compared to the landmark deference doctrines announced in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co. and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.
This Article explores the genesis of this deference regime and analyzes
the Supreme Court’s articulation, application, and interpretation of the
Seminole Rock doctrine from its inception in 1945 to the present day. The
Article then proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock doctrine.
Under this new approach, courts would apply a two-step test to determine
whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation. By relying
upon objective factors, thereby limiting the subjective inquiry, this new
approach falls comfortably between Chevron’s controlling deference and
Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that courts currently apply when
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision. Such an
approach would refine the deference regime to achieve better workability,
greater fairness, transparency, and increased public participation. It
would also balance the competing regulatory and separation of powers
concerns inherent in this critical deference question.
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Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place:
A New Approach to Agency Deference
KEVIN O. LESKE∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Over sixty-five years ago, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,1
the United States Supreme Court established a little-known yet crucially
important administrative law doctrine. In Seminole Rock, the Court held
that federal courts must defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation
of its own regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”2 Astoundingly, despite its doctrinal
significance and practical importance to our administrative state, the
Seminole Rock deference doctrine, which recently has been called “Auer
deference,”3 has gone largely unexamined both by the legal community
and by the Supreme Court, particularly when compared to the landmark
deference doctrine announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.4
∗
Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I would like to thank the
Connecticut Law Review editors and staff for their excellent work on this Article. I also am grateful to
Professor Gil Kujovich, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, of Vermont Law School, and Dean Leticia
Diaz of Barry University School of Law for their support. Special thanks go to my brother, Brian J.
Leske, for his terrific comments and edits throughout the development of this Article. I dedicate this
Article to my parents, Doctors M. Cristina & Gary S. Leske, both extraordinary teachers and scholars,
for their lifelong support and encouragement.
1
325 U.S. 410 (1945).
2
Id. at 414.
3
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). Although Auer followed and, to some extent,
elaborated on Seminole Rock, it remains a mystery why scholars and even some courts—including,
most notably, the Supreme Court—have begun using Auer instead of Seminole Rock to describe the
doctrine. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1089 n.26
(2008) (observing and explaining Justice Scalia’s use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
4
See 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision . . . really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”); Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up
Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (recognizing that Seminole Rock “has lurked beneath the surface and evaded
scholarly and judicial criticism”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 696 (1996) (“Seminole Rock
deference has not received anything like the attention devoted to Chevron, its more famous counterpart.
But it is no less, and is arguably more, important to constitutional governance.”); see also 1 RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (4th ed. 2002) (observing the countless times
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As several scholars have observed, there are myriad problems inherent
in giving an agency this type of so-called “controlling” deference.5 As a
theoretical matter, because the current Seminole Rock standard affords
great deference to an agency’s interpretation, an agency has an incentive
“to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules” and “leave the more
difficult task of specification to the more flexible and unaccountable
process of later ‘interpreting’ these open-ended regulations.”6 And the
“more misty or vacuous the regulations, the broader is the discretion to
interpret, and the less predictable will be the interpretations.”7 An agency
can thus, in theory and in practice, expand its own power while at the same
time avoiding the burdensome notice and comment process of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).8
Chevron has been cited by scholars and the courts); Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional
Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (1999)
(“Chevron is one of the most widely discussed cases in academic literature.”). In fact, a search of
Chevron on June 30, 2013 returned over 7000 citing references in the Lexis “Law Reviews” database,
while a similar search of Seminole Rock returned just over 260. Restricted Shepard’s Summaries for
Chevron and Seminole Rock, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (search “467 U.S. 837” in
“Cases”; when Chevron decision appears, select “Shepardize”; then select “Citing Law Reviews,
Treatises” at the top of the results page; then select “Law Reviews” from Content menu on left side of
the page; repeat process, this time searching for “325 U.S. 410”); see also Walker, supra, at 1346 n.19
(noting that a search of the Westlaw database returned 2912 secondary source citations to Chevron in
1999); cf. Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference
Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators have lavished attention on the
subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of how to interpret
regulations.”).
5
I will refer to Seminole Rock deference as “controlling” deference because it conforms to the
Court’s view that the agency’s “administrative interpretation[] . . . becomes of controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414;
accord Weaver, supra note 4, at 591 (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock’s,
“controlling” because they are outcome determinative). Other scholars have referred to it as “binding
deference.” See Manning, supra note 4, at 617 (discussing the concept of “binding deference,” which
requires “a reviewing court to accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legal texts,
even when a court would construe those materials differently as a matter of first impression”).
6
Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules,
51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The Court’s
Deferences: A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2000, at 10, 11 (observing that
if an agency is confident that it will receive controlling deference for its interpretation, it creates “a
powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of creating the operative
regulatory substance later through informal interpretations”).
7
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 11. There is the added concern that these regulatory
interpretations will be developed internally and issued informally, with no public notice or ability to
challenge them in court, absent an adjudication for a violation of the regulation being interpreted. See
id. (“[T]he affected public will usually be unable to participate in shaping the informally-issued
regulatory interpretations or to effectively challenge them in court.”).
8
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) (“[T]he
[Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the relatively
burdensome notice-and-comment process”); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504,
525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue
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The practical consequences of such a deference regime can therefore
be enormous because most substantive legal rules defining private rights
and obligations are created by agencies applying regulations, rather than by
Congress directly passing statutes.9 For example: unaware of an agency’s
changed interpretation of its regulation, a woman with five minor children
lost benefits previously granted to her;10 a power company that relied on a
previous interpretation of a Clean Air Act regulation was sued after the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changed its view of that same
regulation;11 and the new regulatory interpretation by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers during a review of a Clean Water Act permit opened the door
to the destruction of crucial headwater streams in Appalachia.12
As a constitutional matter, the current Seminole Rock standard raises
separation of powers concerns, a view most notably championed by
Professor John F. Manning.13 By allowing an agency to resolve
ambiguities it created in its own regulations, an agency has effectively
been granted the power of “self-interpretation.”14 This power “contradicts
a major premise of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary
separation of powers case law—that a fusion of lawmaking and lawexposition is especially dangerous to our liberties.”15 In Manning’s view,
there must be a minimum amount of daylight between lawmaking and law
interpretation in order to be consistent with the separation of powers

vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to
make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”).
9
See Manning, supra note 4, at 614–15 (listing examples of agency-established regulations such
as those seeking a civil penalty through an enforcement proceeding or adjudicating a claim for federal
benefits).
10
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 433–34 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
11
Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
559, 566–67 (2006) (describing the “policy dispute over the meaning of ‘modification’ in the Clean Air
Act” and arguing that “[i]t does not seem right to impose many billions of dollars of regulatory costs on
firms for engaging in conduct that would not have been required under interpretations in effect either at
the time the firms engaged in the conduct or at the present time”).
12
See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 203 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“[W]hatever the role of the headwater streams in overall wastershed ecology, the Corps is not required
to differentiate between headwater and other stream types in the determination of mitigation
measures.”).
13
See Manning, supra note 4, at 638–39, 654 (discussing the relationship between Chevron and
Seminole Rock and the “separation of lawmaking from law-exposition,” and applying a separation of
powers analysis to the Seminole Rock decision). Professor Manning also believes Seminole Rock
deference warrants closer scrutiny because of its practical implications for administrative governance
and the Court’s “movement away from deference to agency interpretations of law.” Id. at 614–16.
14
See id. at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock removes an important
affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say what its own
regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency bears little, if any, risk of
its own opacity or imprecision.”).
15
Id. at 617.
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doctrine. Controlling deference under the current Seminole Rock doctrine
does not meet this requirement.17
Compounding each of these problems—and providing a key
justification for the new approach proposed herein—several noted scholars
have voiced serious doctrinal concerns with the current Seminole Rock
standard. Professor Russell Weaver, for instance, observes that courts
“have experienced great difficulty in interpreting regulations and applying
the [Seminole Rock] deference rule to them.”18 He notes that even after
Seminole Rock was decided, the Supreme Court has applied various
deference standards and has “never adequately explained how they should
be applied.”19 Many other legal scholars have likewise concluded that the
amount of deference to be afforded to an agency interpreting its own
regulation is ambiguous at best.20
Building on Professor Weaver’s work, Professor Robert A. Anthony
has further criticized the current Seminole Rock standard based on its
conflict with many of the provisions and underlying goals of the APA.21
He argues that by forcing courts to defer to agency interpretation, the
Seminole Rock standard subverts the APA’s delegation to courts of
determining “the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
16

Id. at 618.
See id. at 654–81 (discussing the questionable approach to separation of powers analysis
utilized in Seminole Rock).
18
Weaver, supra note 4, at 589. As others in the legal community have noted, most of the
scholarship on judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation “has emanated from the
pen of Russell Weaver” starting in the 1980s. Angstreich, supra note 4, at 67 n.70; see, e.g., Russell L.
Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 124–25 (1991) (discussing the
different standards of the deference rule, which result in a varying level of review for each case);
Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV.
35, 36–38 (1991) (stating that “the courts have disagreed as to how the deference rules should be
applied”); Russell L. Weaver, Evaluating Regulatory Interpretations: Individual Statements, 80 KY.
L.J. 987, 987–88 n.3 (1991–1992) (stating that “[t]he Court has applied other standards as well,” with
regard to the deference rule); Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations:
An Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 683–84 (1984) (discussing problems facing courts when
interpreting agency regulations); Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (1992)
(stating that the deference principles applied by the courts “were not always consistent with each
other”).
19
Weaver, supra note 4, at 592.
20
See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1184 (“The amount of deference Seminole Rock
requires has always been ambiguous, also contributing to doctrinal confusion for those lower courts and
commentators who follow such matters.”); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1307 (“[T]he Court
has not clearly established the bounds of Seminole Rock deference.”).
21
Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 9–10 (1996) (stating that “[t]he intent of . . . [section 706 of the APA requiring a
reviewing court to determine the meaning of the terms of an agency action] manifestly was to arm
affected persons with recourse to an independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act,
where, after all, the agency is often an adverse party” and the role of the court is “a far cry” from pure
deference to the agency).
17
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action.”
This abdication of the court’s role contradicts the APA’s
purpose in giving “affected persons . . . recourse to an independent judicial
interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is
often an adverse party.”23
The limitations and shortcomings in the Seminole Rock deference
regime have not gone unnoticed by members of the Supreme Court. Over
twenty years ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that Seminole Rock
deference must not be “a license for an agency effectively to rewrite a
regulation through interpretation.”24 And more recently, several members
of the Supreme Court have questioned the Seminole Rock doctrine. For
example, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by three colleagues) suggested
that “agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will
have adequate notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”25
He opined that by allowing an agency to give “effect to such a hopelessly
vague regulation, the Court disserves the very purpose behind the
delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to
‘resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text.’”26 He also recognized that
such authority undermines the notice and comment rulemaking process
specifically embodied in the APA.27
And even more recently, in 2011, Justice Scalia wrote a short
concurring opinion specifically to highlight his newfound discomfort with
the doctrine: “For while I have in the past uncritically accepted that rule, I
have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.” 28 He then concluded
by stating: “We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case.
When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”29 He soon amplified his
criticism of the Seminole Rock doctrine in an opinion he wrote in the
Court’s 2012–2013 Term, where he explicitly called for the rejection of the

22

Anthony, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
Id. at 9. Professor Anthony also contends that the Seminole Rock doctrine contradicts the
APA’s purpose in allowing for an “exception for interpretative rules in § 553.” Anthony & Asimow,
supra note 6, at 11. These rules should be subject to “plenary judicial review.” Id. (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 553).
24
Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
25
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26
Id. at 518, 525 (alterations in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 696 (1991)); see also Manning, supra note 4, at 615–16 (recognizing Justice Thomas’s criticism
of Seminole Rock’s underpinnings). Thus, although controlling deference may on the one hand
simplify judicial review, it “disserve[s] the interests of the affected public and of persons concerned
with the fairness, efficiency and acceptability of governmental processes.” Anthony & Asimow, supra
note 6, at 11.
27
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
29
Id.
23
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30

Seminole Rock/Auer deference doctrine.
Justice Scalia’s opinion
prompted Chief Justice Roberts to write separately, joined by Justice Alito,
to make the Supreme Court bar “aware that there is some interest in
reconsidering those cases.”31
As a result of these numerous and substantial concerns, some scholars
have argued that the Supreme Court should overrule Seminole Rock. They
claim an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation should be reviewed
under the less deferential standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.32
Under Skidmore, courts are directed to weigh an agency’s interpretation
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”33 Applying such a standard, so their argument goes, would
provide an independent judicial check that would be more faithful to the
constitutionally required separation of powers.34 It also would purport to
address the other concerns by helping remove the incentive to draft vague
regulations.35
Other scholars have reached the opposite conclusion. They argue that
the Court should reaffirm the Seminole Rock doctrine because “[t]he
division of responsibility for statutory interpretation that Chevron
formalized would be undermined if courts reviewed an agency’s informal
regulatory interpretation under Skidmore.”36 Under this theory, courts
cannot carry out Chevron’s mandate to defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language until it has determined the
meaning of the regulation at issue.37 And if a court first rejects the
30
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1342 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
31
Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
32
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see Anthony, supra note 21, at 10 (advocating for a less deferential
standard); Manning, supra note 4, at 618 (same).
33
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
34
Manning, supra note 4, at 618–19.
35
Anthony, supra note 21, at 11–12.
36
Angstreich, supra note 4, at 59; accord Pierce, supra note 11, at 567–68 (suggesting that courts
adopt the Auer deference standard). In Chevron, the Court found that once Congress delegates
rulemaking authority to an agency, courts generally must follow the agency’s regulations that have
been promulgated under that grant of power, as well as to defer to the agency’s interpretation of
statutory provisions it administers. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843–45 (1984). The Chevron doctrine is discussed in more detail infra Part II.B.2. At the time,
Mr. Angstreich’s principal concern was that the Court’s recent decision in Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000), which refused to extend Chevron deference to informal
interpretations of statutes, foreshadowed the overruling of Seminole Rock deference for informal
agency interpretations of regulations. See Angstreich, supra note 4, at 57–58 (“[A] wholesale shift
from Seminole Rock to Skidmore, and even the partial shift that would result from the Court’s using
Christensen to overrule Auer’s holding . . . would undermine Chevron’s allocation of responsibility for
statutory interpretation.”).
37
Angstreich, supra note 4, at 58.
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agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation under Skidmore, it
would not approach the statutory interpretation question under Chevron
from the perspective of the agency’s understanding of the regulation.38
Thus, the court, rather than the agency, would assume the role of making
policy decisions, which would be in contravention of one of Chevron’s key
underlying rationales.39 Reaffirmation of Seminole Rock is consequently
necessary to “shore up” Chevron deference.40
Both of these competing views muster powerful arguments in support
of their respective positions. After careful consideration, I do not agree
that the Seminole Rock standard should be completely abandoned and
replaced with the Skidmore standard. Nor do I agree, however, that the
Seminole Rock standard should remain in its current form and reaffirmed
by the Court. Instead, I offer a new approach.
A comprehensive analysis of the Court’s opinions that apply the
Seminole Rock doctrine, as well as the various deference regimes, reveals
three things. First, substantial doctrinal inconsistency, even confusion,
exists with respect to this deference question, particularly when an agency
is interpreting its regulation informally. Second, when the Court has
invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine, it has engaged in a far more searching
inquiry than the plain text of the standard would suggest. And third, many
of the factors actually considered by the Court in those opinions promote
fair notice, consistency, and accountability in the administrative state,
while muting concerns regarding unconstitutional agency “selfinterpretation” and a lack of an independent judicial check on the agency
interpretation.
My proposed approach to determine whether to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its regulation is a formal, clearly articulated, and relatively
simple standard. It incorporates many of the objective factors previously
applied by the Court to the deference question, as well as traditional factors
courts have looked to when approaching interpretative questions. By
relying upon objective factors, limiting the subjective inquiry, and erring,
in a sense, on the side of the original Seminole Rock deference standard,
this new approach would fall comfortably between Chevron’s controlling
deference and Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that the courts apply
when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision.41
38

Id.
Id.
40
See id. (arguing that “Skidmore’s potential for undermining Chevron leads to a justification for
Seminole Rock deference”). In making his argument, Mr. Angstreich also staunchly defends Seminole
Rock from the criticism that “it gives agencies too great an incentive to promulgate vague regulations,
violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and is incompatible with the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.” Id. at 51.
41
This new approach would recognize the justifications underlying both Chevron and Skidmore
39
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This new approach to an old question would likewise address many of
the concerns voiced over the past several decades by both scholars and
various members of the Court. It also has the benefit of being a pragmatic
solution. Indeed, given both the Court’s recent movement toward cabining
agency deference and its understandable reluctance to overrule its
precedent, a clarification and reformulation of the Seminole Rock deference
regime in this manner would allow the Court to remain faithful to its
current (yet evolving) deference principles without overruling Seminole
Rock expressly.
Part II of this Article begins by looking at the Court’s deference
doctrines established under both Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and, forty years
later, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. A
brief examination of these doctrines as they apply to an agency’s
interpretation of federal statutes will be helpful in framing the separate but
related question regarding an agency’s interpretation of its regulation.
Part III examines the Court’s decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co. and explores the genesis of its deference regime. Because the
Court did not explain its justification in its opinion, this Part by necessity
also discusses how the Court subsequently explained its rationale for the
doctrine in other opinions.
Part IV next analyzes the development and trends surrounding the
Supreme Court’s articulation, application, and interpretation of the
Seminole Rock doctrine from its inception to the present day. This study
shows that the Court has been somewhat inconsistent when applying the
doctrine, thereby helping to contribute to the doctrinal confusion that
currently exists. In fact, since Seminole Rock was decided in 1945, this
analysis shows that the Court has—at different times—ignored the
standard,42 set forth differing articulations of the original standard,43 and
deference and require courts to approach the deference question with a degree of independence—which
falls between these two doctrines. The Chevron doctrine rests on the notion that Congress implicitly
has delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statutory scheme. See Pierce, supra note 11, at
568 (discussing that the Chevron deference standard is based on constitutional principles where
“politically unaccountable judges cannot overrule policy decisions made by politically accountable
agencies”). And although Chevron does not technically mandate “the courts to abdicate their
responsibility for interpreting the law altogether,” when Chevron applies, the agency is granted
controlling deference. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1249. Thus, courts approach the inquiry
with no real independent judgment and instead look simply to determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable. See id. (“[U]nless circumstances otherwise suggest arbitrary or
unreasonable behavior, reviewing courts are often wise to defer to an agency’s greater expertise, and
sometimes, extensive interpretive efforts”). The Skidmore doctrine, on the other hand, is primarily
based on the Court’s respect for the agency’s experience and expertise, reflecting “a policy of judicial
prudence.” Id. Courts are, however, granted some liberty to weigh subjective factors, such as “the
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration” and ultimately, its persuasiveness, in determining
whether to defer. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Thus, under Skidmore, courts
wield more independent judgment when interpreting the regulation than under Chevron.
42
See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1103–04 (observing that the Court routinely failed to
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introduced and incorporated different factors altogether in the standard.
Finally, Part V proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock
doctrine. Under this new approach, courts would apply a straightforward
two-step test to determine whether to defer to an agency’s interpretation of
its regulation. First, as is done when applying the familiar Chevron
deference test, courts would determine whether the regulation is
unambiguous. If the regulation is unambiguous, then the court’s inquiry
naturally would end because it is axiomatic that an agency must follow the
plain language of its regulations. Second, if the regulation is ambiguous,
courts would look to four factors to resolve the deference question: (1) the
agency’s stated intent when the regulation was promulgated; (2) whether
the interpretation had been consistently held by the agency; (3) in what
format the interpretation appears; and (4) whether the regulation being
interpreted “parrots” or otherwise restates the statutory text (whereby the
agency’s view is actually statutory interpretation masquerading as
regulatory interpretation).
II. A DEFERENTIAL FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction
Like any law review article examining a jurisprudential doctrine that
has spanned six decades, this Article cannot turn over every rock. Thus,
before turning to the Court’s deference doctrines, it is necessary at the
outset to take a moment to highlight what this Article does and does not
do. Several of these points may be fairly obvious; others, however, may be
worthy of additional explanation.
First, the issue presented here concerns an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation, and not its governing statute. The latter case, of course, is
governed by Chevron’s deference regime, as will be re-introduced below.
To be sure, agency regulations have their origin in federal statutes by
embodying the Congressional delegation of authority to administer those
statutes. But more often than not, Congress grants agencies broad power
and expects them to make difficult and complex policy choices that
apply Seminole Rock).
43
See, e.g., Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991) (giving the agency
“deference so long as [its interpretation] is reasonable”); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (giving the agency “substantial deference”); Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (recognizing that deference is appropriate for “reasonable” and
“consistently applied” interpretations).
44
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (indicating that an interpretation of a
parroting regulation is not eligible for Seminole Rock deference); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (requiring deference unless an “alternative reading is compelled by the
regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation” (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988))).
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Congress was not willing to make or that it entrusted to agencies.
The task of “administering a statute” is accomplished by the agency in
many ways, including through the promulgation of regulations and the
accompanying interpretation of those regulations. Naturally, these
interpretations, whether an interpretation of the statute or the regulation,
can be “expressed in a great variety of forms—in legislative regulations,
adjudicatory opinions, manuals, court briefs, interpretive rules, policy
statements, staff instructions, opinion letters, audits, correspondence,
informal advice, guidelines, press releases, testimony before Congress,
internal memoranda, speeches, explanatory statements in the Federal
Register, and others.”45 And particularly since these less formal means of
interpreting regulations now dominate the administrative state and
effectively have the force of law by essentially defining the legal rights and
obligations of the public, the particular deference question addressed
herein is (ironically) far from academic.46
Next, given that the Seminole Rock doctrine has not been explored to
nearly the degree of many of the other deference doctrines, there are a
plethora of unresolved questions in this area. These include:
• how and to what extent Chevron applies when, in addition
to challenging the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation under Seminole Rock, a party challenges the
validity of the regulation as interpreted by the agency
under the statute;47
• why the Supreme Court routinely declines to invoke the
Seminole Rock doctrine despite its applicability to the
case before it;48 and
45
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7
YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990).
46
For the most part, this Article does not distinguish among the various specific informal manners
in which an agency expresses its interpretation of its regulation. To be sure, the format is important
and ought to be considered when resolving the deference question. In fact, this factor is considered as
part of the proposed new approach discussed herein. See infra Part V.
47
The few scholars who have explored Seminole Rock deference have reached different
conclusions on this issue. Mr. Angstreich, for example, maintains that the application of Seminole
Rock deference “will be a prelude to the Chevron two-step, because the output of applying Seminole
Rock deference is an input in the application of Chevron deference.” Angstreich, supra note 4, at 73.
In other words, under his view, courts must first interpret the regulation (or decide whether or not to
defer to the agency in its interpretation) under Seminole Rock before deciding whether the
interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute under Chevron. Professor Manning, on the other
hand, is of the view that “to get to Seminole Rock deference, a court must first address the
straightforward Chevron question whether an agency regulation, as interpreted, violates the statute.”
Manning, supra note 4, at 627 n.78.
48
Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer have conducted an empirical study of cases where the
Supreme Court addressed agency interpretations. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1089–90. The
study and data extended to cases in which Seminole Rock was applicable—whether that specific
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• whether the Court should extend its holding in United
States v. Mead Corp.49 (that an agency’s informal
statutory interpretation is only subject to Skidmore
deference) to an agency’s informal interpretation of its
regulation.50
In general, the questions involving the specific interplay between
Chevron and Seminole Rock are beyond the scope of this particular Article.
Moreover, because agencies are often provided with significant leeway
and, often times, very few limitations from Congress as how to achieve the
statutory goal, the applicability of Chevron deference is not necessarily at
issue in these types of cases. In other words, in most of the cases where a
court is determining whether to accept an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation, both the agency’s proffered interpretation and the many other
alternate interpretations, such as those advanced by a challenger, would be
a reasonable interpretation of the statute under Chevron. And the focus of
the Seminole Rock inquiry is one of regulatory construction to determine
what an ambiguous regulation actually means—not the subsequent
question of whether that meaning is consistent with the statute. Nor does
the underlying justification, if there is one, for the Court’s decision not to
invoke Seminole Rock resolve the question presented by this Article,
namely, whether there is an alternative approach to determine whether and
to what extent a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation.51
Having stated what this Article does not do, it should be explained
what this Article does do. This Article’s primary focus is to examine the
Supreme Court cases that actually applied the Seminole Rock doctrine from
its inception in 1945 to the present day, with an emphasis on the factors the
Court relied upon in reaching its deference decision. From that analysis
doctrine was invoked by the Court or not—and documented whether the Court ultimately agreed with
or acquiesced in the agency’s interpretation. Id. at 1120. Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer concluded
that the Court invoked Seminole Rock—and several other deference regimes—“in a small minority of
cases where [each of] those regimes were applicable.” Id.
49
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
50
See id. at 221 (“[U]nder Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the [tariff classification] ruling [by the U.S.
Customs Service] is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness.” (citation omitted)); see
also Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing the holding of Christensen and the
adoption of informal agency interpretations).
51
Of course, to the extent the Court is declining to invoke Seminole Rock due to its imprecise
parameters, it would support the central goal of this Article, which calls for a clearly-articulated test.
There is no data for this assumption, however. As Professor Eskridge and Ms. Baer explain, the
decision not to invoke Seminole Rock could be because the Court has other deference regime options,
or otherwise prefers its ad hoc justifications in this area of law. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at
1104–05. But given the confusion and inconsistency that currently exists in the Supreme Court’s own
cases, see infra Part IV, a clear test would be important in this area, particularly for federal district and
appellate courts faced with the deference question.
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and those factors, it strives to construct and propose a clearly articulated
deference standard that would improve the workability of the doctrine in
this area. In this way, this Article seeks to contribute in some small
measure to the limited, but impressive, scholarship in this area.
B. A Brief Look at the Court’s Related Deference Doctrines
Before turning to an examination of the Seminole Rock doctrine and its
development through the years, this Part briefly visits the Supreme Court’s
deference regimes for agency interpretations of statutory provisions. The
Court’s judicial deference doctrines in this area have evolved steadily over
time in cases such as Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
National Resource Defense Council, Inc. Such cases “now function
collectively as parts of a comprehensive framework for judicial review of
administrative interpretations.”52
Through these cases, the Court has established and refined distinct
tests to determine the level of deference to afford an agency when
interpreting a statute. Although scholars have debated whether each
approach represents a distinct deference doctrine or whether there is one
comprehensive deference doctrine, for practical purposes, they can be
categorized as a continuum of deference levels that courts will afford an
agency.53 This continuum ranges from plenary review of an agency’s
interpretation of a statute (no deference whatsoever), to an intermediate
level of respect under Skidmore, to a controlling deference standard under
Chevron. The latter two are discussed below.
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Until the Supreme Court decided Skidmore v. Swift & Co., its approach
to what weight should be given to an agency interpretation lacked a
cohesive, identifiable doctrine.54 Unlike its famous cousin, Chevron, the
facts presented in Skidmore are not well known, and a brief summary will
provide a colorful backdrop for this important development in
52

Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1239.
Likewise, the Supreme Court appears to be divided on whether there is one deference doctrine
or two. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 852
(2001) (“The opinions in Christensen v. Harris County reveal a cleavage of views among the Justices
on this issue.”). The five Justices in the majority in Christensen recognized two deference doctrines,
Chevron deference and Skidmore deference, while four Justices appear to believe that there is only one
deference doctrine. Id. Of the four Justices that believe in one doctrine, Justice Scalia asserts that
Chevron is the only deference doctrine, while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer seem to believe
that Chevron and Skidmore are separate manifestations of a single deference doctrine. Id. Because it is
not critical to resolve this question for the purposes of this Article, I will refer to them as separate
doctrines within a broader framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations. See
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1239 (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s judicial
deference doctrine following its decision in Skidmore).
54
323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
53
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administrative law.
In Skidmore, seven members of the Swift & Co. packing plant in Fort
Worth, Texas, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to recover
overtime pay.55 Swift & Co. engaged in a “general packing business,
[which included] purchasing, handling, slaughtering, dressing, processing,
selling and distributing livestock in interstate commerce.”56 The regular
daytime work of several of the plaintiffs, including John Skidmore, was
operating the company’s elevators at the plant.57 On some nights,
however, one of them was required to remain in the fire hall (or within
“hailing distance”) in order to respond to fire calls.58 For this extra work,
they were paid between fifty and sixty-four cents for each call, which
rarely took more than an hour to address.59 Thus, although responsible for
fire calls, they were free to pursue “whatever pleasurable pursuits, or
personal duties, they cared for.”60
Skidmore and the others subsequently alleged that they were entitled to
overtime pay for all the time that they were “on-call.”61 Although an
Interpretive Bulletin by the Administrator of the Department of Labor
suggested otherwise, the district court found for the company, compelled
by its view that “pursuing such pleasurable occupations or performing such
personal chores does not constitute work.”62 On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that “[c]ertainly
plaintiffs [were] not entitled to recover overtime compensation for
sleeping.”63 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit analogized the facts in the case
to an example in the Interpretive Bulletin that it had concluded should
apply.64
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a
unanimous opinion, reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision.65 He noted that
Congress had vested responsibility to the court, not the agency, to “find
facts and to determine in the first instance whether particular cases fall

55

Id. at 135.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 53 F. Supp. 1020, 1020 (N.D. Tex. 1942), aff’d 136 F.2d 112 (5th
Cir. 1943), rev’d, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
57
Id.
58
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135. This fire hall was “equipped with steam heat and air-conditioned
rooms” and with “sleeping quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio.” Id. at 136.
59
Id. at 135–36. They were paid fifty cents per call from the effective date of the Fair Labor
Standards Act through January 1, 1940, and then sixty-four cents after that. Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at
1020–21.
60
Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at 1020–21.
61
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
62
Skidmore, 53 F. Supp. at 1021.
63
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943).
64
Id.
65
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
56
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within or without the Act.”
But this, he declared, did not obviate
weighing the Administrator’s “considerable experience in the problems of
ascertaining working time in employments involving periods of
inactivity.”67
The Skidmore Court observed that in both informal ruling and
interpretive bulletins, the Administrator had determined that a “flexible
solution” was called for in order to determine what specific time periods, if
any, of the inactive “on-call” time should be counted.68 The Administrator
also had opined in an amicus brief that although the precise facts of the
case had not yet been addressed in the Bulletin, the general tests pointed to
“the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these employees from the
workweek and the inclusion of all other on-call time.”69
In the court’s opinion, Justice Jackson specifically noted that no
statutory provision established the degree of deference to be given to the
Nonetheless, he recognized that because rulings,
Administrator.70
interpretations, and opinions are “are made in pursuance of official duty,
based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case,” they
were worthy of some respect.71 Thus, “while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, [they] do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”72 Further, their weight would be determined
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”73 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the district court for
determination of what “waiting time,” if any, would be compensable.74
For the next forty years, Skidmore “enjoyed prominence as perhaps the
Supreme Court’s best expression of its policy of judicial deference toward
many if not most agency interpretations of law.”75 Its ongoing vitality,
however, was called into some doubt when the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Chevron.

66

Id. at 137.
Id.
68
Id. at 138.
69
Id. at 139.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 140.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 8, at 1236.
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2. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
The basic facts and holding in Chevron are well known and will be
only cursorily described here. The Court in Chevron was called upon to
determine the meaning of “stationary source” as that term was used in the
Clean Air Act.76 Pursuant to the statute, the EPA promulgated a regulation
that allowed states “to adopt a plantwide definition of the term ‘stationary
source.’”77 This allowed a plant to install or modify particular pollutiongenerating units at its facility without triggering onerous permit conditions
so long as the change did not increase the total emissions from the plant.78
The question, as framed by the Court, was whether the EPA’s decision to
group all these pollution-generating units “as though they were encased
within a single ‘bubble’ [was] based on a reasonable construction of the
statutory term ‘stationary source.’”79
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous 6–0 Court,
concluded that the EPA’s regulation was reasonable, thereby rejecting the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s conclusion
that the “bubble concept” conflicted with the Clean Air Act’s purpose to
improve air quality.80 In the opinion, the Court established the familiar
two-step test to analyze an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered
by that agency. Under the first step, a court looks to the statutory language
to determine whether Congress has directly spoken on the question at
issue.81 If the statute’s language is unambiguous, then the court’s inquiry
is at an end, and the agency’s interpretation of the statutory provision is
irrelevant.82 But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court proceeds to
a second step, where it determines whether the agency’s interpretation is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”83 If the interpretation
is reasonable, then the interpretation is controlling.84
The Chevron Court specifically explained its justification for
establishing a controlling deference standard for an agency’s interpretation
of a statute it administers. According to the Court, an agency is
empowered to “fill the gap” through interpretation because Congress’s
grant of rulemaking authority to the agency creates the presumption “to
76
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (citing 40
C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (1983)).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See id. at 839, 841–42, 845 (concluding that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a
reasonable policy choice). Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take part in the
decision. Id. at 839.
81
Id. at 842.
82
Id. at 842–43.
83
Id. at 843.
84
Id. at 843–44.
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make all policy choices within its sphere of delegated authority.”85
Because agencies possess greater political accountability than the courts,86
and have unique expertise and experience to administer “technical and
complex” regulatory programs,87 administrative agencies are in the best
position to make these tough policy choices.88
As demonstrated by its discussion in court opinions and legal
scholarship, the Chevron test revolutionized the administrative state. And,
at least initially, Chevron’s standard, which accepts reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, was applied broadly to many types
of agency interpretations of statutes.89 Although the Chevron deference
regime continues to evolve,90 it remains one of the most significant
doctrines in administrative law.
III. THE SEMINOLE ROCK STANDARD
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co. announced a new standard under which courts must defer to an
85

Walker, supra note 4, at 1346–47.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices . . . .”).
87
Id.; Walker, supra note 4, at 1346–47.
88
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (suggesting that an ambiguity or silence in the statute may have
been a result of Congress’s inability “to forge a coalition on either side of the question”).
89
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989) (finding that the Secretary of
Labor’s view expressed in Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and subsequent regulation was entitled to
Chevron deference); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844 (1986)
(according Chevron deference to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s “long-held position
that it has the power to take jurisdiction over counterclaims” in state reparation proceedings); Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986) (holding that the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation’s interpretation of a statutory provision was entitled to Chevron deference even
though not contained in a regulation).
90
For example, during the Supreme Court’s 2000–2001 Term, a pair of decisions dramatically
altered the doctrine and at the same time brought new vitality to Skidmore. In 2000, the Court decided
Christensen v. Harris County, where it found that controlling deference under Chevron should not be
afforded to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that was expressed in an informal format, such as an
opinion letter. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). The following year, the Court decided United States v. Mead
Corp., where it similarly ruled a court should only grant an agency Chevron deference when the
interpretation of a statute is authorized by Congress and carries with it the force of law. See 533 U.S.
218, 237 (2001) (“Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate
no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority was not
invoked.”). Taken together, these rulings mean that formal interpretations should be entitled to
Chevron deference and informal interpretations should be reviewed under Skidmore. Id. Perhaps more
importantly, however, and as some scholars were quick to observe, the decisions in Christensen and
Mead raise a potential doctrinal inconsistency in the deference regimes that is not easily explained. See
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 10 (“[The] Court repudiated strong deference for agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes contained in formats lacking the force of law, while apparently
endorsing strong deference for agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations contained in such
formats.”). Although this question is beyond the scope of this Article, the Supreme Court may at some
point have to reconcile this potential doctrinal inconsistency.
86
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agency’s interpretation of its regulation unless it “is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”91 This Part begins by reviewing the
background and legal ruling in Seminole Rock. It next examines the legal
justifications for granting controlling deference to an agency under the
Seminole Rock doctrine, which was not adequately articulated by the Court
until nearly fifty years later in two cases decided in the early 1990s.
A. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
The striking principle that a court must defer to an agency’s
interpretation of its regulation unless the interpretation “is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” had a modest beginning in a
case decided in the midst of World War II.92 In Seminole Rock, the Court
was called upon to determine the “the proper interpretation and application
of certain provisions of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188” under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.93 The Act was enacted to curb
wartime inflation, and the Maximum Price Regulation generally “brought
the entire economy of the nation under price control.”94
The “core” of the regulation at issue “was the requirement that each
seller shall charge no more than the prices which he charged during the
selected base period of March 1 to 31, 1942.”95 In January 1942, Seminole
Rock & Sand “contracted to sell crushed stone to V. P. Loftis Co., a
government contractor engaged in the construction of a government dam,”
at $1.50 per ton, as needed.96 V. P. Loftis Co., however, could not use or
store the stone until August 1942.97 At that time, Seminole Rock & Sand
delivered crushed stone for the original contract price of $1.50 per ton.98
In the interim, Seminole Rock & Sand had contracted with Seaboard Air
Line Railway and subsequently delivered it crushed stone in March 1942 at
a price of sixty cents per ton.99
Seminole Rock & Sand later attempted to enter into additional
contracts for crushed stone with Seaboard Air Line Railway for eighty
cents and $1.00 per ton.100 Chester Bowles, the Administrator of the
Office of Price Administration, then sought to enjoin Seminole Rock &
Sand from selling at a price higher than sixty cents per ton.101 The lower
91

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
Id. at 413–14.
93
Id. at 411.
94
Id. at 413.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 412.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
92
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court, however, found that Seminole Rock & Sand had not exceeded the
highest price charged for its crushed stone during March 1942 and
therefore had not violated the regulation.102 It found that $1.50 per ton was
“the highest price charged by respondent during March, 1942, and that this
ceiling price had not been exceeded.”103 The Fifth Circuit affirmed this
decision.104
On review to the Supreme Court, the issue for the Court was “to
determine the highest price respondent charged for crushed stone” during
the period in question, “within the meaning of Maximum Price Regulation
No. 188.”105 The Court began by recognizing that the Administrator’s
interpretation was only relevant “if the meaning of the words used [in the
regulation] is in doubt.”106 Next, should any ambiguity exist, it found that
“a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the
regulation.”107 With little fanfare or further elaboration, the Court then
announced the standard that was to apply: “[T]he ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”108
After reviewing the regulation’s language, the Court found that,
irrespective of existing contracts for a higher price, the highest price of an
actual delivery during March 1942 established the price ceiling.109 And
“[a]ny doubts concerning this interpretation . . . [were] removed by
reference to the administrative construction” of the regulation.110 The
Court relied on a bulletin issued at the time the Maximum Price Regulation
was issued, which had been made available to retailers and wholesalers.111
Thus, the Court based its finding that the lower court erred on its own
reading of the language of the regulation, as well as “the consistent
administrative interpretation” set forth in the Bulletin regarding the
ambiguous phrase “highest price charged during March, 1942.”112 And in
reaching its conclusion, the Court placed considerable weight on the fact
that other parties had been placed on notice of this consistent
interpretation.113 Overall, the Court performed a much more searching
inquiry to ascertain the meaning of the regulation than the plain language
of the test it purported to apply. In fact, it was only after it largely
102

Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 414.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 415–16.
110
Id. at 417.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 418.
113
Id. at 417–18.
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completed its own interpretive review of the regulation did it look to the
agency’s view to remove “[a]ny doubts concerning [the Court’s]
interpretation” of the Maximum Price Regulation.114
B. A Doctrinal Explanation of Seminole Rock
The Court in Seminole Rock did not provide an explicit justification for
why an agency’s interpretation of its regulation should receive controlling
deference unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. In
two cases decided in the early 1990s, however, the Court shed some light
on the justification for the doctrine. In Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission,115 the Court suggested that, like Chevron,
Seminole Rock deference is based on the agency’s delegated lawmaking
powers.116 And in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,117 the Court observed
that Congress’s delegation necessarily entails the authority to interpret
regulations and that this congressional delegation provides the basis for
judicial deference.118
In Martin, the Court considered “the question to whom should a
reviewing court defer when the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission furnish reasonable but conflicting
interpretations of an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretary
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.”119 On review, the
Supreme Court did not cite the Seminole Rock standard that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation should be upheld unless “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”120 Rather, it merely stated
that it “is well established that an agency’s construction of its own
regulations is entitled to substantial deference.”121
Specifically, it stated: “Because applying an agency’s regulation to
complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique
expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”122 Thus, the Court found that an
agency interpreting its own regulation was a “component” of Congress’s
delegation of lawmaking powers to an agency.
114

Id. at 417.
499 U.S. 144 (1991).
116
Id. at 151.
117
501 U.S. 680 (1991).
118
Id. at 698.
119
Martin, 499 U.S. at 146 (citing Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.
§ 651 (1988)).
120
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
121
Martin, 499 U.S. at 150 (quoting Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
122
Id. at 151 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 568 (1980)).
115
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That same year, the Court similarly noted in Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines that controlling deference was a product of the same rationale as the
Chevron doctrine:
As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary’s authority to
promulgate interim regulations “not . . . more restrictive
than” the HEW interim regulations necessarily entails the
authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and the discretion to
promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable
interpretation thereof. From this congressional delegation
derives the Secretary’s entitlement to judicial deference.123
These decisions suggest that Seminole Rock deference is similarly
grounded in an implicit delegation from Congress. And this doctrinal
underpinning will have implications in Part IV, when proposing the proper
level of deference to be accorded to the interpretation of regulations.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEMINOLE ROCK DOCTRINE
With this framework now firmly in place, this Part explores the major
cases where the Court has invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine.124 This
analysis discusses the varied articulations of the standard employed by the
Court over the past sixty years. It shows that, despite the lack of explicit
factors set forth in the Seminole Rock standard, the Court has consistently
considered certain issues when applying the standard. These include, most
prominently, whether the agency’s interpretation has been consistent over
time, whether the agency stated a contrary intent when it originally
promulgated the regulation, and the format in which the agency has
expressed its interpretation.125
Since the Court’s decision in Seminole Rock in 1945, members of the
Court have cited it nearly thirty times for the general proposition that the
agency’s interpretation is to be given “controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”126 But even so, the
123
501 U.S. 680, 698 (1991) (alteration in original); see also Angstreich, supra note 4, at 96–99
(suggesting that the Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998),
adopted a background principle that the controlling deference to agency interpretation of its regulations
is a necessary component to its authority to promulgate regulations).
124
The Court has confronted the issue of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation in many
cases where it did not explicitly rely upon or invoke Seminole Rock. See supra note 42. The benefit of
an examination where Seminole Rock was actually invoked is to allow an analysis of the factors and
considerations the Court deemed worthy of explicit consideration and of the development of the
doctrine as a whole, as expressed and applied by the Court.
125
These factors become the basis of a new approach proposed in Part V.
126
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 284 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ballard v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 544 U.S. 40, 70
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Allentown
Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 390 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461
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Court has set forth differing articulations of the Seminole Rock doctrine.
These cases have been analyzed and categorized below according to
several general trends.
These categories show that, in a sense, the Court has come full circle.
Its approach to the deference question began with an expressed standard
that suggested an almost unbridled respect for the agency’s interpretation
of its regulation. And while the Court struggled over decades to strike a
balance between deference and accountability, it ultimately reached
approximately the same place from which it departed: an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation will carry the day unless it is plainly
erroneous, with little real regard for such considerations as the agency’s
stated intent when promulgating the regulation, its prior interpretation on
that regulation, or the manner in which that interpretation has been
expressed. But this too, may soon change again due to the Court’s recent
and new found interest in the doctrine.
A. The Early Years (1945–1970)
Although Seminole Rock was decided in 1945, its standard was not
cited by the Supreme Court until 1955 in Peters v. Hobby.127 And even in
that opinion, it appeared only in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stanley
Reed and was cited without any analysis or specifics with respect to its
standard.
In Peters, the Court reviewed the petitioner’s assertion that his
“removal and debarment from federal employment were invalid.”128 At
(1997); Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186, 201 (1996); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514
U.S. 87, 103 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994); id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 297 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S.
431, 436 (1994); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office
of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987); id. at 170 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 589
(1981) (White, J., dissenting); Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 566; United States v. Larionoff, 431
U.S. 864, 872 (1977); N. Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of
Am., Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); United States v.
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965); Peters v. Hobby, 349
U.S. 331, 355 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv.
Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–96 (2009) (citing Auer); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397
(2008) (same); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007)
(same); Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 171 (2007) (same).
127
Peters, 349 U.S. at 355 (Reed, J., dissenting). A citation to Seminole Rock first appeared in
1946 in M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, but it was relied upon for the general proposition that
challenges to the Price Administrator’s authority under the Emergency Price Control Act must “be
raised initially in a proceeding before the Emergency Court of Appeals.” 327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946).
128
Peters, 349 U.S. at 333. Dr. John P. Peters was a professor of medicine at Yale University and
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issue was an interpretation by the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty
of the Federal Security Agency.129 Justice Reed cited Seminole Rock
(along with several other cases) in his dissent: “Such reasonable
interpretation promptly adopted and long-continued by the President and
the Board should be respected by the courts. That has been judicial
practice heretofore.”130 Despite not quoting the precise standard language
of Seminole Rock, his invocation of the case is noteworthy because he
considered that it was significant that the Board’s interpretation had been
“promptly adopted” and the agency had adhered to this view over time.131
It was another ten years before Seminole Rock appeared again—this
time in a majority opinion. Thus, it took twenty years for the Seminole
Rock standard to be relied upon by a majority of the Justices. In its 1965
decision in Udall v. Tallman,132 the Court reviewed “the effect of
Executive Order No. 8979 and Public Land Order No. 487 upon the
Secretary of the Interior’s authority to issue oil and gas leases.”133 The
respondents challenged the decision by the Secretary to award
approximately 25,000 acres in the Kenai National Moose Range in Alaska
to a different set of parties.134 According to the respondents, although
these other parties had filed their applications earlier, those applications
were premature because the lands in question were not eligible to be leased
because of the land’s status as a wildlife refuge.135 In granting the leases to
the original lessees, the Secretary construed both the executive order and
his land order to provide no bar to oil and gas leases on lands that had been
designated as wildlife refuges, such as the Moose Range.136
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit determined that the executive order in question (which had created
the Moose Range) and the subsequent public land order “had withdrawn
the lands in controversy from availability under the Mineral Leasing Act,
and that the lands remained closed to leasing until they were reopened by a
revised departmental regulation.”137 Therefore, the court concluded that
the applications of the prior parties were ineffective, and the leases that had
been originally issued to them were void.138
was employed as a Special Consultant in the United States Public Health Service of the Federal
Security Agency. Id.
129
Id. at 333–34.
130
Id. at 355 (Reed, J., dissenting).
131
Id.
132
380 U.S. 1 (1965).
133
Id. at 2.
134
Id. at 2–3.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 4.
137
Id. at 3.
138
Id.
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139

The Supreme Court reversed.
In ruling for the original lessees, the
Court cited Seminole Rock’s “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
standard.”140 But the Court’s analysis was much more extensive than one
would have expected under such a deferential standard. In fact, the Court
devoted nearly twenty pages of its opinion to analysis of the Mineral
Leasing Act, the applicable regulations, and even the legislative history of
the Act.141 And of special significance to the Court was its view that the
Secretary had “consistently construed” the orders at issue and that his
“interpretation [had] been made a repeated matter of public record.”142
Furthermore, the Court noted that, unlike the respondents, the original
leases had “been developed in reliance upon the Secretary’s
interpretation.”143
The early years of the doctrine were thus notable not for what the
Court did do, but rather for what it did not do. In fact, two decades elapsed
before a majority of the Court even applied the Seminole Rock doctrine in
one of its cases. Apart from its decision in Udall v. Tallman, where it
considered both the consistency of the agency’s position and whether there
had been reliance interests at stake,144 the Court merely cited to the case a
handful of times with no real inquiry.145
B. The 1970s and 1980s: Confusion and Inconsistency
During the 1970s and 1980s, the opinions in which the Court cited
Seminole Rock did not elaborate further on the standard or specify a precise
analysis that was required. This period generally can be characterized as
one of doctrinal confusion and inconsistency.
The first example is Ehlert v. United States.146 At issue in Ehlert was
“whether a Selective Service local board must reopen the classification of a
registrant who claims that his conscientious objection to war in any form
crystallized between the mailing of his notice to report for induction and

139

Id. at 4.
Id. at 17 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945)).
141
Id. at 4–23.
142
Id. at 4. As the Court held nearly twenty years later in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), the Udall Court likewise found that “[t]he
Secretary’s interpretation may not be the only one permitted by the language of the orders, but it is
quite clearly a reasonable interpretation [and] courts must therefore respect it,” 380 U.S. at 4.
143
Udall, 380 U.S. at 4.
144
Id.
145
See INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (“[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.” (alteration in original)); Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969)
(same); see also United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (“We defer on this issue to the
definition of ‘train’ given by the administrative agency which has oversight of the problem.”).
146
402 U.S. 99 (1971).
140
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147

his scheduled induction date.”
The local board had refused to reopen
William Ehlert’s classification because it found that his new anti-war view
“did not constitute the ‘change in the registrant’s status resulting from
circumstances over which the registrant had no control’” as required under
a Selective Service regulation.148
As it had done originally in Seminole Rock, the Court looked first to
whether the regulation was ambiguous.149 Because “the meaning of the
language [was] not free from doubt,” the Court found it was “obligated to
regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative
interpretation if the Government’s be such.”150 It cited Seminole Rock for
this standard.151 The Court concluded that “[t]he Government’s
interpretation is a plausible construction of the language of the actual
regulation, though admittedly not the only possible one.”152 Thus, at least
in this case, the Court viewed the Seminole Rock standard to require an
agency’s interpretation to be both “reasonable [and] consistently
applied.”153
A similar recharacterization of the Seminole Rock standard appeared
several years later in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Walton
League.154 In that case, the Court again relied upon Seminole Rock, noting
that the interpretation in question “sensibly conforms to the purpose and
wording of the regulations.”155 The Court, however, repeated Ehlert’s
formulation that controlling deference was appropriate only where the
interpretation was “reasonable” and “consistently applied.”156
This pattern of citing Seminole Rock, but articulating a slightly
different standard than the original opinion, continued well into the next
decade.157 For example, in reaching the conclusion that deference to the
147

Id. at 100.
Id. (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971)).
149
Id. at 104.
150
Id. at 105.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
423 U.S. 12 (1975).
155
Id. at 15.
156
Id. (quoting Ehlert, 402 U.S. at 105).
157
See, e.g., United States v. Swank, 451 U.S. 571, 589 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (“The
[Internal Revenue] Service’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference.”); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (“The Court has often repeated the general
proposition that considerable respect is due [to] the interpretation given [a] statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration. An agency’s construction of its own regulations has been
regarded as especially due that respect.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), the first post-Chevron case in
which Seminole Rock appears, Justice Marshall observed in his dissent that “an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations is ‘of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation,’” Id. at 865 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
148
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agency was warranted, the Court in Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs,158 stated that “the Secretary’s view is
not only eminently reasonable but also is strongly supported by the fact
that [the Department of] Labor wrote the regulation.”159 Quoting Seminole
Rock, the Court recognized that the agency’s interpretation was “deserving
of substantial deference unless it [was] plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.”160 But the Court noted in its analysis that the
interpretation at issue “ha[d] been, with one exception, consistently
maintained through Board decisions.”161
Dissenting in Mullins Coal, Justice Marshall observed that the Court
was “correct that the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is
entitled to deference,” but he cautioned that “deference has its bounds” and
that Seminole Rock deference was “not a license for an agency effectively
to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”162 In his view, the agency’s
interpretation was “contrary to the plain language of the regulation,
conflict[ed] with comments of the Secretary accompanying the final
promulgation of the regulation, and create[d] an unnecessarily complex
regulatory scheme.”163 Therefore, he viewed “the agency’s interpretation
as plainly inconsistent with the regulatory language and history,” and
would not have deferred as the majority was willing to do.164
In this line of cases, the Court failed to cite Seminole Rock with
precision. Moreover, its analyses were not necessarily consistent with the
precise standard it was applying, at least as it was originally announced.
Nonetheless, the Justices did consistently consider several key factors—
including reasonableness and consistency—when applying the standard.
In addition, Justice Marshall’s consideration of the agency’s original
comments when it promulgated the regulation in his Mullins Coal dissent
foreshadowed a new factor that the Court would explicitly adopt the
following year.
C. A New Standard: Gardebring v. Jenkins and Thomas Jefferson
University v. Shalala
A significant change to the Seminole Rock standard emerged in 1988 in
Gardebring v. Jenkins,165 a holding that was reaffirmed six years later in
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
158
484 U.S. 135 (1987).
159
Id. at 159.
160
Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 170 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
485 U.S. 415 (1988). In other cases throughout the remainder of the 1980s and beginning of
the 1990s, the Court remained faithful to its original articulation of the Seminole Rock standard. See,

254

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:227

166

Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala.
In these two cases, the Court
found that the Seminole Rock deference analysis required consideration of
the original intent of the agency when it promulgated the regulation at
issue.
On review in Gardebring was the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit’s decision that the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(under Commissioner Sandra Gardebring) had violated a federal regulation
issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).167
The Eighth Circuit had found that in this case the regulation required that
the agency give written notice to the respondent (Kathryn Jenkins) before
suspending her benefits for a certain period of time.168 The Supreme Court
disagreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that this “notice
provision requires only that general program information be available, in
‘written form’ and ‘orally as appropriate.’”169 Although conceding that “it
would be wise (assuming that it were feasible and not too expensive) to
precede every such change with adequate advance notice,” the Court found
that the plain language of the regulation did “not unambiguously impose
any such requirement on state welfare agencies.”170
With respect to the lower court’s determination that the state agency
was “required . . . to prepare a written notice that adequately explained the
lump-sum policy and to distribute it to all current [aid] recipients and all
future applicants,” the Court considered the view of the HHS Secretary.171
The Court noted that the Secretary, who was responsible for enforcing the
regulation, believed that “it [was] generally appropriate to rely on an oral
explanation of the consequences of receiving a lump-sum payment when
the recipient report[ed] it to the family’s caseworker.”172
When determining whether to accept the federal agency’s
interpretation, the Court recognized that “the Secretary had not taken a
e.g., Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 511 U.S. 431, 436 n.2 (1994) (adhering to Seminole Rock’s
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,
45 (1993) (same); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (same); see
also Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 297 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the “Department of Labor is entitled to ‘substantial deference’ in
the interpretation of its own regulations,” so long as such interpretation is “reasonable in light of the
regulations’ text and purpose”).
166
512 U.S. 504 (1994).
167
Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 417–18.
168
An amendment to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Program provided
that “a family receiving nonrecurring lump-sum income” was ineligible for benefits for a certain time
period after it received that payment. Id. at 417 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982)).
169
Id. at 429 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 233 (1987)).
170
Id. at 429 n.15.
171
Id. at 421, 429.
172
Id. at 429.
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position on this question until this litigation,” but the Court nonetheless
deferred:
[W]hen it is the Secretary’s regulation that we are construing,
and when there is no claim in this Court that the regulation
violates any constitutional or statutory mandate, we are
properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the
Secretary’s unless that alternative reading is compelled by
the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the
Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation.173
This marked a significant change to the Court’s formulation of the
Seminole Rock standard: a court must defer unless “the regulation’s plain
language” dictates otherwise, or a different interpretation is compelled by
“other indications” of an agency’s intent at the time it promulgated the
regulation.174 Notably, seven Justices (including two in partial dissent)
endorsed this formulation.175
A separate opinion by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explicitly agreed
with this new formulation.176 Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Brennan,
however, “disagree[d] with the Court’s application” because the agency
had taken “two inconsistent positions” during the litigation.177 Because she
regarded the agency’s earlier position as “far more reasonable,” she would
have held the agency to its “earlier and better interpretation.”178 Thus,
these Justices viewed the fact that the agency had previously interpreted
the regulation (presumably at the time of its promulgation) differently than
it did during the litigation as dispositive.179
Several years later in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, the
Court reinforced that the Gardebring standard represented an accurate
formulation of the Seminole Rock standard.180 At issue in Thomas
Jefferson University was a Medicare regulation that prohibited
reimbursement of certain educational activities borne by hospitals.181 The
HHS Secretary interpreted the regulation “to bar reimbursement of
173
Id. at 430. Ms. Jenkins had not argued that the agency’s regulation, as interpreted by the
agency, violated the statute or that it violated her constitutional rights, such as due process. Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 416. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, and
Justice Marshall only joined the last paragraph of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Id. at 432 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 432–33.
178
Id. at 435.
179
Id. It is not clear from Justice O’Connor’s opinion whether the agency had indeed stated the
“better” interpretation at the time that it had originally promulgated the regulation. Id.
180
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
181
Id. at 506 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (1993)).
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educational costs that were borne in prior years not by the requesting
hospital, but by the hospital’s affiliated medical school.”182
Although the Court initially phrased the question as “whether the
Secretary’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulatory
language,” the Court quoted Seminole Rock and stated that the agency’s
interpretation must be given “controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”183 The Court next repeated
Gardebring’s formulation to explain the Seminole Rock standard: “In other
words, we must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation unless an
‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by
other indications of the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation.’”184
In deferring to the Secretary, the Court found that the agency’s
interpretation was “far more consistent” with the regulation than the
petitioner’s interpretation.185 But the Court noted that it did not matter
because “even if this were not so, the Secretary’s construction is, at the
very least, a reasonable one, and we are required to afford it ‘controlling
Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that the
weight.’”186
interpretation should be rejected on the basis that it conflicted with a past
interpretation. The Court acknowledged that “it is true that an agency’s
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently
held agency view.’”187 But it found that “because petitioner fail[ed] to
present persuasive evidence that the Secretary ha[d] interpreted the antiredistribution provision in an inconsistent manner,” the maxim did not
apply.188 A majority of the Court deferred to the agency’s interpretation.189
Significantly, four Justices in dissent expressed their concern with the
Seminole Rock doctrine and would not have deferred to the agency’s
interpretation.190 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor,
and Ginsburg, asserted that granting an agency the power to “selfinterpret” its own regulation was in stark tension with an agency’s
responsibility to resolve statutory ambiguities.191 In Justice Thomas’s
view, “the Secretary ha[d] merely replaced statutory ambiguity with

182

Id.
Id. at 506, 512 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
184
Id. at 512 (quoting Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430).
185
Id. at 515.
186
Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414).
187
Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
188
Id.
189
Id. at 518.
190
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191
Id.
183
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192

regulatory ambiguity.”
He opined that by giving “effect to such a
hopelessly vague regulation, the Court disserves the very purpose behind
the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to
resol[ve] . . . ambiguity in a statutory text.”193
Justice Thomas recognized that it was “perfectly understandable, of
course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so
maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make
law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome
rulemaking process.”194 But he warned that such authority undermines the
notice and comment procedures in the APA: “[A]gency rules should be
clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice
concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”195 Consequently, he
would not have deferred and would have found that the Secretary’s
interpretation violated the APA.196
With the original stated intent of the agency now grafted onto the
Seminole Rock standard—and with several members of the Court clearly
anxious about the ramifications of controlling deference in these
circumstances—Gardebring and Thomas Jefferson University reflected the
appropriate test for courts to determine whether or not to defer to an
agency interpreting its own regulation.197 This new “test,” however, was
short lived.
D. Auer v. Robbins: A Return to Seminole Rock’s Original Formulation
In 1997, the Court reverted to its original formulation in Seminole
Rock, eliminating any mention of the intent of the agency. In Auer v.
Robbins,198 the Court’s unanimous opinion displayed an open willingness
to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation with no real
inquiry as to factors considered by the Court in the prior two decades.199
192
193

Id. at 525.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696

(1991)).
194

Id.
Id. Justice Thomas quoted Kenneth Culp Davis and Richard J. Pierce’s treatise on
administrative law for analogous support. See id. (“An agency whose powers are not limited either by
meaningful statutory standards or . . . legislative rules poses a serious potential threat to liberty and to
democracy.” (quoting 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 11.5
(3d ed. 1994))).
196
Id. at 529–30 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(a), (c), (g) (1993)).
197
See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor J.,
dissenting) (stating that although she took seriously the Court’s “obligation to defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations, . . . . [a]n agency is bound by the regulations it
promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the amendment process through substantive changes
recorded in an informal policy manual that are unsupported by the language of the regulation”).
198
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
199
See id. at 461 (delineating that the deferential standard was met using the Secretary’s creation
195
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At issue in Auer was the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of both
statutory language and regulatory language.200 The petitioners, including
Sergeant Francis Bernard Auer, were officers employed by the St. Louis
Police Department.201 They brought suit against the St. Louis Board of
Police Commissioners, including Commissioner David A. Robbins, for
overtime pay that they alleged was owed to them under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).202
The Board claimed that the officers were exempted from overtime pay
eligibility because they were “bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional” employees.203 Such employees are not eligible for overtime
pay under the FLSA.204 In support of its view, the Board relied on a
regulation issued by the Secretary of Labor. This regulation set up a
“salary-basis” test to determine whether a public-sector employee is a
“bona fide” employee (i.e., a salaried employee) under the regulation.205
Under the regulation:
An employee will be considered to be paid “on a salary
basis”. . . if under his employment agreement he regularly
receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis,
a predetermined amount constituting all or part of his
compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction
because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work
performed.206
The Secretary interpreted this to mean that if an employee’s “compensation
may ‘as a practical matter’ be adjusted in ways inconsistent with the test,”
the employee is not “on salary” and thus is eligible for overtime pay.207
The officers contended that their duties were not “of an executive,
administrative, or professional nature.”208 And even if their duties were of
such nature, they argued that, because their pay was subject to reduction
for various disciplinary infractions related to the “quality or quantity” of
their work, they were therefore not salaried employees under the salarybasis test.209
In determining whether the officers were salaried employees, the Court
focused on whether “an employee’s pay is ‘subject to’ disciplinary or other
of the salary-basis test).
200
Id. at 454.
201
Id. at 455.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 454.
205
Id. at 455 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(f), 541.2(e), 541.3(e) (1996)).
206
Id. (alterations in original) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)).
207
Id. at 454–55.
208
Id. at 455 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.1(a)–(e), 541.2(a)–(d), 541.3(a)–(d)).
209
Id.
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deductions whenever there exists a theoretical possibility of such
deductions, or rather only when there is something more to suggest that the
employee is actually vulnerable to having his pay reduced.”210 The
officers argued that, according to their police manual, all department
employees are theoretically subject to disciplinary deductions in pay, even
including the sergeants; therefore, they are “subject to” such deductions
and hence non-exempt under the FLSA.211
At the request of the Court, the U.S. Solicitor General filed an amicus
brief offering the Secretary of Labor’s view on the salary-basis test.212
According to the Secretary, the salary-basis test denied exempt status to
employees who are “covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or other
deductions in pay ‘as a practical matter.’”213 Thus, “if there is either an
actual practice of making such deductions or an employment policy that
creates a ‘significant likelihood’ of such deductions,” then an employee did
not have salaried status.214
Relying on and directly quoting the Seminole Rock standard, the Court
noted that “[b]ecause the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s
own regulations, his interpretation of it is . . . controlling unless ‘plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”215 Based on this
deferential standard, the Court found the burden “easily met.”216 Indeed,
citing both the American Heritage Dictionary and Webster’s New
International Dictionary, the Court simply stated that the “critical phrase
‘subject to’ comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns.”217
Because there was an actual practice, and no significant likelihood of such
deductions, the Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.218
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Auer is important because it
marked a return to prior cases where the Court engaged in a rather
mechanical application of the Seminole Rock standard.219 The Court
210

Id. at 459 (emphases added).
Id. at 455.
212
Id. at 453, 461.
213
Id. at 461.
214
Id.
215
Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) and
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
The Court’s decision is important for another reason. The officers had protested that the
Secretary’s interpretation of its regulation was presented during the litigation and in a legal brief, and
therefore was not worthy of deference. Id. at 464. The Court, however, summarily ruled that the
Secretary’s interpretation was not a “post hoc rationalization.” Id. at 462 (quoting Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (internal brackets omitted)). It simply stated:
“There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question.” Id. The Court provided no explanation or further
reasoning for this conclusion.
211

260

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:227

declined to engage in a searching review of the Secretary’s interpretation.
Nor did it determine whether there were other indications of the
Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation that would
compel a different view than the Secretary’s or any other factors such as
whether it was consistently applied.
E. Gonzales v. Oregon: A Brief Return to Intent
In its 2006 decision in Gonzales v. Oregon,220 the Court briefly
returned to its pre-Auer decisions where the Court performed a more
searching inquiry into whether controlling deference was appropriate.221
Moreover, it resurrected one factor previously applied in Gardebring and
Thomas Jefferson University, and also created a new “exception” that
limited when controlling deference is due under Seminole Rock.
At issue in Gonzales was whether the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) authorized the U.S. Attorney General to “prohibit doctors from
prescribing regulated drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide,
notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure.”222 The Attorney
General had issued an interpretive rule that addressed the implementation
and enforcement of the CSA as it applied to the State of Oregon’s
enactment of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).223
The United States argued that the interpretive rule was an elaboration
of one of its regulations and therefore entitled to controlling deference
under the Seminole Rock standard as elaborated upon in Auer.224 This
interpretive rule, however, essentially parroted much of the statute:
[A]ssisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose”
within the meaning of 21 CFR 1306.04 (2001), and that prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled
substances to assist suicide violates the Controlled
Substances Act. Such conduct by a physician registered to
dispense controlled substances may “render his
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest” and
therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation under
220

546 U.S. 243 (2006).
Id. at 249. In the time between the Auer and Gonzales decisions, the Court cited to Auer
twelve times.
Restricted Shepard’s Report for Auer v. Robbins, LEXIS ADVANCE,
https://advance.lexis.com (search “519 U.S. 452” in “Cases”; when the Auer decision appears, select
“Shepardize”; then select “Citing Decisions” at the top of the results page; then select “U.S. Supreme
Court” from Court menu on left side of the page; then narrow timeline to 1997–2006). Many were
simply decisions remanding the case in light of Auer. The other cases, as a general matter, remained
faithful to the Auer formulation and analysis.
222
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 248–49 (citing Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
223
Id. at 249 (citing ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–127.990 (2003)).
224
Id. at 256 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005)).
221
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225

21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4).

Although the Court recognized that “[a]n administrative rule may
receive substantial deference if it interprets the issuing agency’s own
ambiguous regulation,” it declined to extend that deference here.226
Because the language addressed in the interpretive rule “comes from
Congress, not the Attorney General,” the Court held that deference was not
warranted.227
More specifically, according to the Court, the rule’s repetition of
statutory phrases, such as “legitimate medical purpose” and “in the course
of professional practice,” shed no light on “a central issue in this case:
Who decides whether a particular activity is in ‘the course of professional
practice’ or done for a ‘legitimate medical purpose’?”228 Therefore,
because “the regulation gives no indication how to decide this issue, the
Attorney General’s effort to decide it now” through his interpretive rule
“cannot be considered an interpretation of the regulation.”229 Summing up,
the Court observed that “[a]n agency does not acquire special authority to
interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience
to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory
language.”230 And, “[s]imply put, the existence of a parroting regulation
does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the
regulation but the meaning of the statute.”231 This holding thus established
the aptly-named “anti-parroting” exception to Seminole Rock deference.232
And if these were not reasons enough, the Court offered another for its
conclusion. Because the Attorney General’s current interpretation could
not “be justified as indicative of some intent the Attorney General had in
1971” when the regulation was promulgated, the Court also found
deference was not in order.233 In fact, quoting Thomas Jefferson
225
Id. at 254 (alterations in original); see 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2006) (explaining how the
Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke a physician’s registration if it is “inconsistent with the
public interest”).
226
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997)).
227
Id. at 257; see Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (but for How Long?): Justice
Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 32
(2007) (explaining the evolution of various levels of deference afforded by the Court to administrative
agencies).
228
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented. Relying
heavily upon the Seminole Rock standard, they argued that the Attorney General’s interpretation was
“clearly valid, given the substantial deference [the Court] must accord it.” Id. at 275 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). They also questioned the majority’s creation of the exception for interpretations that
merely “restate the terms of the statute itself” as finding no support in Auer v. Robbins. Id. at 277.
233
Id. at 258 (majority opinion).
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University, it found: “That the current interpretation runs counter to the
‘intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation’ is an additional reason
why [Seminole Rock/]Auer deference is unwarranted.”234
The Court’s decision in Gonzales was therefore important to the
development of the Seminole Rock doctrine for two reasons. First, it
marked the return of an analysis of the agency’s stated intent at the time
the regulation in question was promulgated when applying the Seminole
Rock analysis. Second, it created the “anti-parroting” exception to the
Seminole Rock test.
F. Post-Gonzales (2006 to Mid-2011): Back to Seminole Rock
From 2006 (when Gonzales was decided) until mid-2011, the Court
invoked the Seminole Rock doctrine eight times.235 In these cases, the
Court cited neither Thomas Jefferson University nor Gardebring, and
declined to scrutinize the intent of the agency at the time the regulation
was issued.236 But the Court did consider some of the other previously
considered factors in determining whether deference was appropriate.
For example, in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,237 a
unanimous Court found that two Department of Labor interpretations fell
“well within the principle that an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulations being interpreted.”238 The Court reasoned that:
A provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act “exempt[ed]
from the statute’s minimum wage and maximum hours rules
‘any employee employed in domestic service employment to
provide companionship services for individuals who (because
of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such
terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the
Secretary [of Labor]).’”239
One Department of Labor regulation stated that “companionship” workers
who “are employed by an employer or agency other than the family or
234

Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011); Chase Bank USA,
N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011); Coeur Ala., Inc. v. Se. Ala. Conservation Council, 557
U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–96
(2009); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552
U.S. 312, 328 (2008); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672
(2007); Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007). The only opinion wherein
the Court cited Seminole Rock instead of Auer for the Seminole Rock deference standard during this
period was Long Island Care. 551 U.S. at 171.
236
See cases cited supra note 235.
237
551 U.S. 158 (2007).
238
Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239
Id. at 161–62 (second alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006)).
235
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household using their services” fall within the statutory exemption.240
Another regulation, however, was “inconsistent” with this exemption.241
In affirming the agency’s interpretation, the Court noted that the
Department “may have interpreted these regulations differently at different
times in their history.”242 It ruled, however, that “as long as interpretive
changes create no unfair surprise,” such a “change in interpretation alone
presents no separate ground for disregarding the Department’s present
interpretation.”243 The Court did, however, perform a more searching
inquiry than it did in Auer.
In 2008, the Court also decided Federal Express Corp. v.
Holowecki,244 which essentially reaffirmed the Seminole Rock standard,245
but was otherwise notable in two respects. In a 7–2 decision, the Court
recognized the “anti-parroting” exception established in Gonzales, but
declined to cite Thomas Jefferson University or look to the agency’s intent
when it promulgated the regulation at issue.246
The case arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA) and required the Court to determine the meaning of the
phrase, “a charge alleging unlawful discrimination,” which was found in
both the ADEA and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s
(EEOC) implementing regulations.247
One of the agency’s regulations defined “charge” as “a statement filed
with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges
that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage
in actions in violation of the Act.”248 And another section explained the
“five pieces of information a ‘charge should contain.’”249 The next
240
241

Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (2006)).
Id. at 168. The Court identified the inconsistent regulation as the following:
[T]he Department’s “General Regulation” that defines the statutory term “domestic
service employment”. . . . says that the term covers services “of a household nature
performed by . . . employee[s]” ranging from “maids” to “cooks” to “housekeepers”
to “caretakers” and others, “in or about a private home . . . of the person by whom he
or she is employed.”

Id. (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
242
Id. at 170.
243
Id. at 170–71; see also id. (finding that “the Department’s recourse to notice-and-comment
rulemaking in an attempt to codify its new interpretation makes any such surprise unlikely here”
(citation omitted)).
244
552 U.S. 389 (2008).
245
Id. at 397.
246
Id. at 397, 397–99 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006)).
247
See id. at 393 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006)) (noting also that the phrase has no statutory
definition).
248
Id. at 395–96 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.3 (2007)).
249
See id. at 396 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(a)) (“[A] ‘charge should contain’: (1)-(2) the names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of the person making the charge and the charged entity; (3) a
statement of facts describing the alleged discriminatory act; (4) the number of employees of the
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subsection was more permissive and suggested that a charge was
“sufficient” if it was in writing, contained the name of alleged
discriminator, and generally alleged the discriminatory act.250
To resolve these ambiguities, the Court turned to the EEOC’s view of
its regulations. The agency opined that the regulations “identif[ed] certain
requirements for a charge but [did] not provide an exhaustive
definition.”251 Therefore, in its view, even though a document might meet
the “minimal requirements” of its regulations, it did not necessarily mean it
was a “charge.”252
Analogizing to Chevron, the Court stated that the EEOC was entitled
to deference “when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it
has put in force.”253 It then cited Auer for the Seminole Rock standard: the
Court would “accept the agency’s position unless it [was] plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”254 Adhering to the Seminole
Rock standard, the Court accepted the agency’s position that the
regulations were not definitive with respect to the required components of
a “charge” and that “[a] permissible reading [was] that the regulations
identif[ed] the procedures for filing a charge but [did] not state the full
contents a charge document [had to] contain.”255
Although it recognized that “charge” was a term in the underlying
statute and that therefore the Auer anti-parroting exception might apply,
the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether Auer applied because
it would have upheld the agency’s interpretation under the less deferential
standard of review set forth in Skidmore.256
In 2009, in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings &
Investment Plan,257 the Court, in another unanimous decision, upheld the
agencies’ interpretation as set forth in the Government’s amicus brief
because it was neither “plainly erroneous [n]or inconsistent with the
regulation.”258 Although it recognized that the agencies’ interpretation had
“fluctuated,” it nonetheless deferred.259 The Court found that “the change
charged employer; and (5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state
proceedings.”).
250
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(b)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (“A charge shall be in writing
and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges
received in person or by telephone shall be reduced to writing.”).
251
Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397. Although not a party in the case, the Government
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the EEOC. Id.
252
Id.
253
Fed. Express Corp., 552 U.S. at 397.
254
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
255
Id.
256
Id. at 398–99.
257
555 U.S. 285 (2009).
258
Id. at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
259
Id. at 296 n.7.
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in interpretation alone present[ed] no separate ground for disregarding the
[Treasury’s and the Labor] Department’s present interpretation.”260
Furthermore, according to the Court, “the fact that the interpretation [was]
stated in a legal brief [did not] make it unworthy of deference, as ‘[t]here is
simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does not reflect the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”261
The Court’s opinions on agency deference from Gonzales—which
itself may represent something of an anomaly due to its unique set of
facts—to mid-2011262 are more difficult to characterize as a whole than
some of the earlier decisional trends on the subject. But, at a minimum,
they show that the Court has more or less reverted to its original Seminole
Rock approach.
G. Mid-2011 to the Present: Seminole Rock Reconsidered?
In June 2011, the Court released its opinion in Talk America, Inc. v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,263 in which Justice Scalia notably
highlighted the Seminole Rock doctrine in a short concurrence.264 At issue
in Talk America was whether local telephone service providers “must make
certain transmission facilities available to competitors at cost-based
rates.”265 The Court observed that “[n]o statute or regulation squarely
addresse[d]” whether the providers were required to do so under the
applicable statute and regulations.266 Consequently, it stated that “[i]n the
absence of any unambiguous statute or regulation,” the Court would “turn
to the FCC’s interpretation of its regulations.”267 And the FCC had
interpreted its regulations to require the facilities to be made available if
they were to be used “to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network
260
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S.
158, 171 (2007)).
261
Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
262
See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011) (deferring under
Auer because there was “no reason to suspect that [the agency’s] views reflect[] anything other than the
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chase Bank
USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 (2011) (“Under the principles set forth in Auer, we give
deference to this interpretation.”); Coeur Ala., Inc. v. Se. Ala. Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 284
(2009) (deferring under Auer because the interpretation “presents a reasonable interpretation of the
regulatory regime” and therefore is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations); Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672 (2007) (citing the Auer standard
and finding “that deferential standard is plainly met here”).
263
131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
264
See id. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how he would reach the same holding as
the majority without relying on the Seminole Rock doctrine, since “the FCC’s interpretation is the
fairest reading of the orders in question”).
265
Id. at 2257 (majority opinion).
266
Id. at 2260.
267
Id. at 2260–61.
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with the competitor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic.”
Although the FCC was not a party to the litigation and had merely
appeared as amicus curiae and submitted its view in a brief, the Court
nonetheless deferred to the agency. Citing Auer and another recent
decision, the Court found that deference for the agency’s interpretation was
still appropriate “even in a legal brief, unless the interpretation [was]
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]’ or there [was] any
other ‘reason to suspect that the interpretation [did] not reflect the agency’s
fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.’”269
In analyzing the interpretation, the Court first noted that the FCC’s
interpretation, far from being “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation[s],” was “more than reasonable.”270 It also noted that “there
[was] no danger that deferring to the Commission would effectively
‘permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de
facto a new regulation,’” and that the interpretation did not constitute “a
post-hoc rationalization.”271 Concluding its opinion by reversing the court
of appeals, the Court framed the decision as having relied exclusively on
the Seminole Rock doctrine: “The FCC as amicus curiae has advanced a
reasonable interpretation of its regulations, and we defer to its views.”272
Although Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court, he wrote a
concurring opinion specifically to highlight his newfound discomfort with
the Seminole Rock doctrine: “For while I have in the past uncritically
accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”273
He summarized many of the criticisms set forth previously, including that
it encourages agencies to enact vague regulations, may violate the
separation of powers doctrine, and “frustrates the notice and predictability
purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.”274
Significantly, he concluded his short concurrence by stating: “We have not
been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be
receptive to doing so.”275
Following Justice Scalia’s “shot across the bow” in Talk America, the
Court had an opportunity to address the Seminole Rock standard in 2012 in
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.276 Although it illustrates the
268

Id. at 2257.
Id. at 2261 (second alteration in original) (quoting Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S.
Ct. 871, 881 (2011)).
270
Id. at 2262 (alteration in original).
271
Id. at 2263 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)).
272
Id. at 2265.
273
Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as “Auer
deference.” Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
269
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rare case where the Court declined to grant an agency Seminole Rock
deference, the Court failed to provide a framework and precise test for
deciding the Seminole Rock question.277 Instead, the Court reasoned that
select past cases (some of which are not even part of the Seminole
Rock/Auer line of cases) provided support for withholding agency
deference.278
In SmithKline Beecham, the Court faced the relatively straightforward
question of “whether the term ‘outside salesman,’ as defined by
Department of Labor (DOL or Department) regulations, encompasse[d]
pharmaceutical sales representatives whose primary duty is to obtain
nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer’s
After discussing the
prescription drugs in appropriate cases.”279
regulations at issue and the DOL’s interpretation, the Court turned to
whether it should defer to that interpretation.280
The Court began by noting that “Auer ordinarily calls for deference to
an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, even when that
interpretation is advanced in a legal brief.” 281 But it then recognized that
“this general rule does not apply in all cases.”282 The Court first quoted the
Seminole Rock/Auer standard that the rule does not apply when the
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”283
It then cited to additional language in Auer that deference might not be
appropriate “when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s
interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment
on the matter in question.’”284
In an attempt to discern when an agency’s interpretation does not
reflect its fair and considered judgment, the Court listed several
examples.285 First, it “might occur when the agency’s interpretation
conflicts with a prior interpretation.”286 This concern had been set forth in
other cases, such as Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, and
demonstrates the Court’s attempt to incorporate previous holdings into its
inquiry.287 Second, the Court noted that when an agency’s interpretation
appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position,’” or a
277

Id. at 2166–67.
Id. at 2167 (referencing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499
U.S. 144, 170–71 (1991) and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) to support the
Court’s claim that Auer deference was unnecessary).
279
Id. at 2161.
280
Id. at 2166.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
285
Id.
286
Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)).
287
Id.
278
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‘“post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past
agency action against attack,” then Seminole Rock deference is not due.288
These, too, represent the Court’s acceptance of past limits on Seminole
Rock.
Based on these factors, the Court had no hesitation in declining to
give the DOL’s interpretation deference under Seminole Rock.289 The
Court found that acceptance of the DOL’s interpretation would not give
fair warning to the public and would constitute “unfair surprise.”290
Although acknowledging the advantages of such a highly deferential
standard, it instead applied the less deferential Skidmore standard.291 Then,
even when taking into account this less deferential standard, the Court was
unable to defer to the DOL’s interpretation and “employ[ed] traditional
tools of interpretation” to conclude that the sales representatives at issue
were “outside salesmen” under the regulations.292
Both Talk America and SmithKline Beecham are significant for what
they did and did not do. Although the Talk America majority, which
included Justice Scalia, endorsed the Seminole Rock doctrine, Justice
Scalia’s concurrence notably raised the issue of whether the doctrine
should be revisited and possibly overruled by the Court.293 SmithKline
Beecham is significant because the Court identified specific “exceptions”
which demonstrated its acceptance that the doctrine is not unbridled.294
And in doing so, it marked a retreat from Auer’s nearly automatic grant of
deference to the agency. But the Court failed to resolve the doctrinal
concerns raised by Seminole Rock, as a general matter.
Following in the wake of Talk America and SmithKline Beecham, the
Seminole Rock doctrine prominently appeared in the Court’s opinions in
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center.295 The various
opinions—and especially the concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts—unquestionably demonstrate that the Court is prepared to reevaluate the doctrine in a suitable case.
In Decker, the Court was called upon to decide whether the federal
“Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations require permits
before channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads can be discharged
into the navigable waters of the United States.”296 Under the CWA and the
288
Id. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 213 (1988) and Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
289
Id. at 2168.
290
Id. at 2167 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007)).
291
Id. at 2168–69.
292
Id. at 2170, 2172.
293
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265–66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
294
SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166.
295
133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
296
Id. at 1330.
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implementing regulations issued by the EPA, a permit for such runoff is
required if the discharge is “deemed to be ‘associated with industrial
activity.’”297 In turn, an EPA regulation defines “the term ‘associated with
industrial activity’ to cover only discharges ‘from any conveyance that is
used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to
manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial
plant.’”298 In an amicus brief filed in the case, “[t]he EPA interprets its
regulation to exclude the type of stormwater discharges from logging roads
at issue.”299 Citing Auer, the Court concluded that, because the EPA’s
determination was a “reasonable interpretation of its own regulation,”
Seminole Rock deference would be accorded to that interpretation.300
With respect to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, made clear that the Court “as a general
rule, defers to it unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.’”301 The Court then held that the “EPA’s
interpretation [was] a permissible one.”302 As a separate rationale to defer
to the EPA’s interpretation under Seminole Rock, the Court noted that
“there is no indication that [the EPA’s] current view [was] a change from
prior practice or a post hoc justification adopted in response to
litigation.”303
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia voiced his dissatisfaction with the
Seminole Rock doctrine. He decried that “[e]nough is enough” with
respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their rules mean,
under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock deference.304
Unlike in Talk America, where the “agency’s interpretation of the rule was
also the fairest one, and no party had asked [the Court] to reconsider” the
doctrine, Justice Scalia maintained that the application of the Seminole
Rock doctrine in Decker “[made] the difference.”305 Furthermore, he
asserted that the “circumstances of these cases illustrate Auer’s flaws in a
particularly vivid way.”306
Noting that the Court had never set forth a “persuasive justification”
for Seminole Rock deference, Justice Scalia identified many of the
297

Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006))
Id. at 1330–31 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2006)).
299
Id. at 1331 (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24–27,
Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338, 11-347)).
300
Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
301
Id. at 1337 (citing Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 871, 881 (2011) (quoting Auer,
519 U.S. at 461)).
302
Id.
303
Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166–67 (2012)).
304
Id. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
305
Id.
306
Id.
298
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criticisms of the doctrine set forth by scholars in academic literature and by
Justices in past decisions.307 He concluded his criticism of the Seminole
Rock doctrine by opining that “however great may be the efficiency gains
derived from Auer deference, beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not
only has no principled basis but contravenes one of the great rules of
separation of powers,” namely, the power of self-interpretation.308
Accordingly, he would have resolved the meaning of the regulation in
question by applying “familiar tools of textual interpretation” such as the
fairest reading of the regulations.309
But the most significant aspect of this case (with respect to the future
development of the Seminole Rock doctrine) was the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, which was devoted entirely
to highlight the Court’s interest in the doctrine.310 The Chief Justice called
special attention to Justice Scalia’s opinion, which “raise[d] serious
questions about the principle set forth” in Seminole Rock and Auer.311 He
acknowledged that although “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider that
principle in an appropriate case,” the present case was not appropriate due
to the lack of fully-developed arguments by the parties on the doctrine.312
But recognizing that the doctrine goes “to the heart of administrative
law” that “arise as a matter of course on a regular basis,” he then
specifically made the bar “aware that there is some interest in
reconsidering those cases.”313 The Chief Justice concluded his opinion by
stating that he “would await a case in which the issue is properly raised and
argued.”314
Decker, in combination with Talk America and SmithKline Beecham,
provides the strongest evidence that the Court will agree to hear a case
involving Seminole Rock in order to re-evaluate the doctrine.
Consequently, it is possible that the Court could soon resolve many of the
questions emanating from its opinions over the past sixty-eight years. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the Court, in re-evaluating the
doctrine, will reject the doctrine, will take the opportunity to create a
consistent framework or test (as exists for statutory interpretation under
Chevron) for courts to apply when deciding whether to defer under
307
Id. at 1341 (quoting Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) and Anthony, supra note 21, at 11–12, and generally citing Manning, supra
note 4).
308
Id. at 1342.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
311
Id. (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
312
Id. at 1338–39.
313
Id. at 1339.
314
Id.
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Seminole Rock, or will simply add to the confusion by endorsing the
doctrine without adding meaningful limits or parameters for the lower
courts to apply.315
V. A NEW APPROACH
A. Introduction
This Part proposes a new approach to the Seminole Rock doctrine that
is based upon an analysis of the doctrine as it has been applied from 1945
to the present day. At the outset, it is worth highlighting that the Court in
Seminole Rock did not explain its justification for giving an agency
controlling deference for its interpretation of its regulation. Not only does
this raise questions as to whether the Court knew at the time that its brief
statement concerning deference would provide the basis for a seminal
administrative law doctrine, but the absence of an underlying rationale for
the doctrine might also help explain the doctrine’s “slow start” with respect
to its appearance in Supreme Court jurisprudence during the first two
decades following the decision.
Yet when the Court began to apply the standard more routinely
(primarily in the 1970s through the mid-1980s), the Court’s analysis was
often more searching than the text of the standard would have suggested
was necessary.316 And despite the lack of explicit explanation or guidance
in Seminole Rock as to how one might determine whether an interpretation
was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” the Court
consistently looked to certain factors when deciding whether to defer.317
Principal among these factors was an inquiry into whether the agency’s
interpretation had been consistent over time.318 And in the short-lived rule
announced in Gardebring v. Jenkins, the Court explained that the Seminole
Rock standard also required courts to analyze the agency’s intent when it
originally promulgated the regulation in question.319 Likely motivating this
more searching inquiry into the deference question was the concern—
voiced by several members of the Court during the 1990s—that the
Seminole Rock standard provided an agency with the incentive to issue
316

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
317
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (creating the anti-parroting
exception); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (explaining that the agency had not engaged in
post hoc rationalization, which might have undermined its entitlement to deference); Gardebring v.
Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988) (considering the agency’s intent at the time it promulgated the
regulation in question); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965) (emphasizing that the agency had
consistently interpreted the order in question in opting to defer to it).
318
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter Cnty. Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc., 423
U.S. 12, 15 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); Udall, 380 U.S. at 16–17.
319
Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430.
316
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vague regulations and “reinterpret” them whenever the need presented
itself.320
But after the Court’s 1997 unanimous opinion in Auer, the Court
seemed to shy away from a meaningful inquiry into whether to defer—and
particularly from any inquiry into the agency’s intent at the time it
promulgated the regulation, as set forth in Thomas Jefferson University and
Gardebring.321 Indeed, the Auer decision once again suggested that not
much more is required than a brief look at the agency’s interpretation
before accepting it.
Although the Court seemed to revive the “intent” factor in Gonzales in
2006,322 this too was short-lived. In post-Gonzales cases, such as Long
Island Care,323 National Association of Home Builders,324 Holowecki,325
and Kennedy,326 the Court did not mention the agency’s intent when it
promulgated the regulation as a relevant factor in determining whether to
defer. While it looked at the other various factors, the current trend,
overall, suggests that the Court has reverted back to its original Seminole
Rock approach.
But Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Talk America opened the
door to revisiting not only the contours of the doctrine, but the doctrine
itself.327 And because the Court did not need to reconsider the doctrine as
a whole in order to deny Seminole Rock deference to the agency at issue in
SmithKline Beecham,328 the Court has yet to squarely address the longstanding practical and doctrinal concerns that were resurrected by Justice
Scalia in his Talk America and Decker opinions.
Reflecting on the Court’s most recent pronouncements, I believe that it
missed an important opportunity to establish a test and define the precise
contours of the Seminole Rock doctrine in SmithKline Beecham and
Decker. In neglecting to do so, the Court has perpetuated the doctrinal
inconsistency—and even confusion—set forth in its opinions over the past
320
See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“An agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and may not attempt to circumvent the
amendment process through substantive changes recorded in an informal policy manual that are
unsupported by the language of the regulation.”); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague
regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make
law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”).
321
Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 512; Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 512.
322
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258.
323
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007).
324
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672–73 (2007).
325
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008).
326
Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 295–97 (2009).
327
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be receptive to
doing so.”).
328
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012).
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sixty-five years. Taken altogether, however, these sometimes-divergent
opinions are important because many of the factors considered by the
Court in those cases promote fairness, consistency, and accountability in
the administrative state. And if adopted as part of an established test for
Seminole Rock deference, they would go a long way to allay concerns of
unconstitutional agency “self-interpretation” and lack of an independent
judicial check on the agency interpretation. It is these factors that therefore
provide the foundation for the new standard I propose below.
B. A New Approach to the Seminole Rock Doctrine
Some scholars have argued, expressly or impliedly, that the Supreme
Court should overrule Seminole Rock.329 They claim that an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations should be reviewed under the less
deferential standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.330 Professors
Robert Anthony and John Manning, for example, have extensively
explored various practical and constitutional concerns with the Seminole
Rock doctrine as currently applied by the Court.331
Other scholars have reached the opposite conclusion. Professor
Richard Pierce, Jr. and Scott Angstreich, for example, have defended the
Seminole Rock standard.332 They believe that the Court should reaffirm
and retain the Seminole Rock doctrine, thereby protecting the highly
deferential standard set forth in Chevron.
I find neither approach entirely satisfying. In fact, I find myself
between a rock and a hard place when asked to choose between them. So
rather than surveying their arguments and ultimately choosing a side, my
goal here is to offer a practical solution that aims to address legitimate
criticism on both sides of the issue. Guided by the Court’s prior opinions
and deference analyses over sixty years, I propose a new approach. This
approach does not wholly reject or accept Seminole Rock deference and
instead represents an intermediate level of deference that essentially
combines features of the current controlling deference standards, including
Seminole Rock and Chevron, with the less deferential standard of
Skidmore.
The standard continues to value the expertise and experience that an
agency brings to the table when determining the meaning of a regulation.
329
Manning, supra note 4, at 618; see also Anthony, supra note 21, at 9–10 (indicating that the
Supreme Court should not let agencies judge their own regulations). Justices on the Supreme Court
have likewise expressed concern with the doctrine. E.g., Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Shalala v. Guernesey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108, 110–11 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
330
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
331
Anthony, supra note 21, at 4–8; Manning, supra note 4, at 618.
332
Angstreich, supra note 4, at 112; Pierce, supra note 11, at 569–72.
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And while it allows the agency’s proffered interpretation to remain the
focal point, it also ensures that the judiciary will play a more prominent
and independent role when reviewing the underlying regulation than under
the current Seminole Rock standard. It accomplishes this important goal by
incorporating objective criteria into the analysis to determine whether to
defer.
But the test does not go so far as to include a key feature of the
Skidmore standard: its reliance on the “persuasiveness” as the “ultimate
touchstone for deference.”333 By eschewing such a factor, a court’s ability
to substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency will be more
limited. While this may not entirely satisfy some critics, such as Professor
Manning, who believe that a court must have “an independent judicial
check,” it nonetheless should satisfy their view that “it is crucial to have
some meaningful external check upon the power of the agency to
determine the meaning of the laws that it writes.”334
And while I recognize that these scholars may believe that it would be
prudent to replace the Seminole Rock standard with Skidmore’s test, I find
it to be unrealistic for both pragmatic and doctrinal reasons. As a
pragmatic matter, the Court has reaffirmed the Seminole Rock doctrine as
recently as the 2012 Term and it seems extremely unlikely to sweep away
so many years of adherence to the doctrine now. As a doctrinal matter, the
modification that I propose will remain faithful to Seminole Rock’s core
holding,335 thereby avoiding the need to overrule the case directly.
I also acknowledge the many advantages to retaining and reaffirming
Seminole Rock in its current form. For example, it would enable agencies
to streamline policy changes (especially when leadership in the Executive
Branch changes) and to “shore up” Chevron.336 I ultimately believe that,
on balance, a change of the current standard would better effectuate
consistency, transparency, and accountability in the administrative state,
including the potential to “enhance the efficacy of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, improve regulated parties’ ability to conform their conduct to
the law’s requirements, and provide the legal community a firmer
benchmark against which to measure and control arbitrary conduct by

333

Merrill & Hickman, supra note 53, at 862 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Manning, supra note 4, at 618, 682.
335
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
336
Angstreich, supra note 4, at 58; see also Pierce, supra note 11, at 604 (arguing that overruling
Seminole Rock would “exacerbat[e] the problem of delay between the time a President is elected and
the time when the courts will allow his policy preferences to replace those of his predecessor”).
Professor Pierce, however, suggests several modest improvements to the doctrine, including two
suggestions that are addressed in the test proposed here: (1) whether the agency’s interpretation is
merely a “litigating position”; and (2) whether the “antiparroting exception” to Seminole Rock
deference applies. Id. at 605–06.
334
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337

officials in the field.”
The formulation of the Seminole Rock standard that I advance
essentially incorporates the following three key elements: (1) the core
holding of the decision itself—namely, that deference to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is warranted unless the
interpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”;
(2) features relied upon by the Court in other deference regimes, such as
Chevron; and (3) factors from the Court’s previous decisions applying
Seminole Rock doctrine.
The new deference approach for courts is divided into a two-step
test.338 As in Chevron, when faced with an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation, the first step would be to determine whether the regulation is
ambiguous. If ambiguous, the second step would be to apply four
objective factors to the deference questions.339 These factors are: (1) the
administrative agency’s stated intent at the time of the regulation’s
promulgation; (2) whether the interpretation currently advanced has been
consistently held; (3) in what format the interpretation appears; and (4)
whether the regulation merely restates or “parrots” the statutory language.
The analysis of these factors would determine whether or not the agency
would be entitled to controlling deference under Seminole Rock.
1. Step One of the New Seminole Rock Test
As in Chevron, a court would determine whether to grant Seminole
Rock deference using a two-step test.340 In Chevron’s familiar two-step
test, a court first looks to whether Congress has directly spoken on the
question at issue.341 If Congress has, the court’s inquiry is at an end.342
However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the court determines
whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”343 If permissible, the interpretation is controlling.344
When assessing an agency’s interpretation of a regulation, a similar
first step would ask whether the regulation at issue is ambiguous. If there
is no ambiguity, the reviewing court need not consider the agency’s
337
Manning, supra note 4, at 685; see id. (explaining why it would be advantageous to adopt
“structural incentives for agencies to draft clearer regulations”).
338
Just as Chevron applies only when an agency is interpreting a statute that it has been granted
the authority to administer, so too does this test apply only when an agency is interpreting a regulation
it administers. If the agency were interpreting a regulation that it does not administer, a court generally
would apply the Skidmore test.
339
As discussed infra Part V.B.2.a, these factors give meaning to the aspect of the Seminole Rock
standard that precludes deference if the interpretation is “inconsistent with the regulation.”
340
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
341
Id. at 842.
342
Id. at 842–43.
343
Id. at 843.
344
Id. at 843–44.
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interpretation and would enforce the plain language of the regulation.345 If
the court finds that the regulation is ambiguous, it should then proceed to
the multifactor inquiry set forth below to decide whether the agency’s
interpretation satisfies the other prong of the Seminole Rock formulation,
specifically, whether it is “inconsistent with the regulation.”346
As an initial matter, the use of a two-step test should come as no
surprise to those who have looked closely at the doctrine.347 And it should
not raise any serious objections. An agency simply cannot prevail (under
any deference regime) if it proffers an interpretation that directly conflicts
with the plain language of the regulation. As stated by the Court in
Christensen, deference in that situation would “permit the agency, under
the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation.”348
The adoption of such a step also has direct support from the Seminole
Rock decision itself. The Court prefaced its statement that the agency’s
interpretation must be accepted unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation” by noting that the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation was only relevant “if the meaning of the works used [in the
regulation was] in doubt.”349 In addition, it may well be that any agency
interpretation that conflicts with plain language of the regulation, by
definition, “is plainly erroneous.”350
2. Step Two of the New Seminole Rock Test
Step two of the new Seminole Rock test would look to four objective
factors to determine whether to grant controlling deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its regulation. Unlike Skidmore, where courts subjectively
weigh the “persuasiveness” of the agency’s explanation, courts applying
this test would mechanically analyze: (1) the stated intent and/or
interpretation of the agency (if it exists) when the agency promulgated the
345
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (asserting that there was no
ambiguity in the law and, therefore, the analysis should focus on the “plain words of the regulation”).
346
Id.
347
See Angstreich, supra note 4, at 70–71 (noting that Seminole Rock doctrine would be better
expressed as a two-step process).
348
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“An agency is bound by the regulations it
promulgates . . . .”).
349
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
350
As discussed in Part III, although the Supreme Court rarely explicitly mentioned this inquiry
when determining whether to grant Seminole Rock deference, it was abundantly clear from the context
of those opinions that the regulation at issue was ambiguous. In any event, in Gardebring v. Jenkins,
the Court clearly articulated the Seminole Rock standard as requiring deference unless an alternate
interpretation is “compelled by the regulation’s plain language.” 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988). Likewise,
in Christensen v. Harris County—nearly fifty-five years after the Seminole Rock decision—the Court
explicitly reaffirmed that “deference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is
ambiguous.” 529 U.S. at 588.
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regulation at issue; (2) whether the agency’s interpretation has been
consistent over time; (3) the format in which the agency offers its
interpretation; and (4) whether the regulation in question merely repeated
the statutory language.
a. Stated Intent of the Agency at the Time It Promulgated the
Regulation
When determining whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation should be granted controlling deference, courts would begin by
looking to whether the agency expressed a contrary intent when it
originally promulgated the regulation in question. For example, courts
should understandably be wary of deferring to the new interpretation if the
agency had explained in a preamble to a final rule how a particular
regulation would function, set forth a contrary interpretation upon
promulgation, or issued a statement contemporaneously with the
regulation.
Not only does the consideration of an agency’s intent when it
promulgated the regulation at issue “most closely approximate[] the
Supreme Court’s announced guidance,” it provides a necessary check on
an agency’s discretion.351 If the intent of the agency is defined at the time
a regulation is issued, the public is entitled to rely upon that interpretation
when deciding how to act or conduct its business. Indeed, the method for
an agency to create legal obligations by enacting regulations is to engage in
notice and comment rulemaking under the APA. As its name suggests, this
administrative process gives notice to the public and generally provides for
an opportunity to submit comments on the rule before it is finalized.352
Because “[t]raditional concepts of due process [are] incorporated into
administrative law,” proper APA rulemaking therefore enforces both
equitable principles of fair notice and constitutional due process
concerns.353 Incorporating an analysis of the agency’s stated intent in
deciding whether to defer to its proffered interpretation therefore reinforces
this safeguard.
Limiting an agency from deviating from its stated intent when it
promulgated the regulation at issue likewise would also help bring the
Seminole Rock doctrine in line with the related and prevailing view that
post-enactment statements by Congress on prior legislation are suspect. As
351

Noah, supra note 6, at 291–92.
See Thomas L. Casey, III, Towards Function and Fair Notice: Two Models for Effecting
Executive Policy Through Changing Agency Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes and Rules, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 725, 738–40 (providing an overview of APA rulemaking process requirements).
353
Id. at 757 (quoting Satellite Broad Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As Mr. Casey points out, some courts have “incorporated broader equitable
considerations into its fair notice analysis” beyond “purely . . . constitutional due process
requirements.” Id. at 758.
352
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Professor Lars Noah succinctly and astutely point outs: “Ironically, when
interpreting regulations, courts appear to give the most credence to postpromulgation expressions of agency intent, precisely the converse of the
view that post-enactment expressions of legislative intent deserve little if
any weight.”354
Looking to the agency’s stated intent also draws support from several
of the Court’s more recent opinions applying the doctrine. For example, in
Gardebring v. Jenkins, seven Justices (including two in dissent) endorsed
the proposition that the applicable legal test and view holds that the Court
is “properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the [agency’s]
unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain
language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation.”355 And in Thomas Jefferson University v.
Shalala, the Court likewise explained that the Seminole Rock standard
required an analysis as to whether an alternative interpretation was
compelled by indications of the agency’s “intent at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation.”356 Finally, in 2006, the Court in Gonzales v.
Oregon relied on its finding that because the current interpretation ran
counter to the “intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation,”
Seminole Rock deference was unwarranted.357
Moreover, as set forth in more detail immediately below, the
consistency of an agency’s position is the next factor in the test proposed
here. Determining the stated intent of the agency at the time of the
regulation’s promulgation therefore provides a needed baseline for
determining whether the agency’s position has, in fact, been consistent
over time.
b.

Whether an Agency’s Interpretation of Its Regulation Is
Consistent with Prior Interpretations

Next, courts should consider whether the proffered agency
interpretation is consistent with prior interpretations by the agency. This
factor provides an important check against newly minted agency
interpretations that are not a result of reasoned decision making. Looking
to the agency’s consistency would effectively provide a disincentive for
agencies to hastily change an interpretation, most likely through an
354

Noah, supra note 6, at 284.
485 U.S. 415, 430, 432 (1988) (emphasis added).
356
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 430) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Mullins Coal would have rejected the agency’s
interpretation in that case, in part, because it conflicted with “comments of the Secretary accompanying
the final promulgation of the regulations . . . .” Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 166 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
357
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at
512 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
355
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informal manner.
As a theoretical matter, as Professors Michael Asimow and Robert A.
Anthony point out, changed interpretations do not warrant deference
because most, if not all, of the justifications for giving an agency deference
are simply not present when a new or changed interpretation is: (1) not
consistent with earlier ones; (2) unlikely to be a long-standing
interpretation; (3) not adopted contemporaneously with the regulation; (4)
not adopted with public participation; and/or (5) more likely to disturb
reliance interests.358 Thus, they argue, a court should be “free to address
the interpretive issue with judicial neutrality” and it is “in a clear position
to determine its own interpretation of the agency regulation.”359
For this reason, “[o]f all the Skidmore factors, consistency seems most
widely used.”360 Insisting upon consistency as an express factor thereby
“directs courts to give weight to interpretations that have not changed over
time, affording longstanding administrative interpretations respect, in part,
simply because they are long-standing.”361
Consideration of consistency also reinforces related principles
articulated by the Court that ensure sound agency decision making and
governmental transparency. For example, in Thomas Jefferson University
v. Shalala, the Court acknowledged that “it is true that an agency’s
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently
held agency view.”362 The Court has also suggested that when an agency
358
Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion? Inconsistent Interpretive Rules,
25 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Winter 2000, at 16, 16.
359
Id. Professors Asimow and Anthony note, however, that:

An agency interpretation should of course be accorded the consideration that the
agency’s specialized work may warrant. Very often—probably in the great majority
of cases—the court’s independently arrived-at interpretation will concur with that of
the agency. But that outcome should be the result of the court’s own free decision,
not of some mechanistic deference to an informal agency position not promulgated
by notice and comment or otherwise pursuant to delegated lawmaking authority.
Id. at 16–17.
360
Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1144 (2001); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Theories of Statutory
Interpretation: The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2081, 2113 (2005) (discussing Skidmore’s
reliance on consistency).
361
Aprill, supra note 360, at 2113; see N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12
(1982) (stating that an agency’s own longstanding interpretation ought to be given “particular
deference”).
362
512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)). Other cases
involving Seminole Rock deference reinforce the view that the consistency of the agency’s
interpretation has been an important factor. For example, in one of the first cases applying the
Seminole Rock doctrine, Udall v. Tallman, the Court noted that the agency had consistently construed
the orders at issue. 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). Likewise, six years later in Ehlert v. United States, the
Court cited Seminole Rock when it stated that it was “obligated to regard as controlling a reasonable,
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changes its view, it has an affirmative duty “to explain its departure from
prior norms.”363
In the 2012 SmithKline Beecham decision, the Court stated that
Seminole Rock deference might not be appropriate “when the agency’s
interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation.”364 Indeed, the Court
has explicitly held that “the consistency of an agency’s position is a factor
in assessing the weight that position is due.”365
Of course, there can be good reasons for an agency to change its
interpretation and for allowing them broad leeway to do so. The agency
should be prepared, however, to justify that decision, particularly if it
elects to forego a notice and comment procedure. At bottom, consistency
is a key component of any functioning administrative system; if an agency
abdicates its responsibility to guard, and even promote, this principle,
courts should not be hesitant to do so.366
Finally, acknowledgment that an agency’s interpretation has remained
unchanged fosters, as one scholar notes, “a kind of stare decisis in order to
merit judicial deference.”367 By putting agencies on notice that courts will
look to the consistency of the agency’s interpretation, agencies will
consequently be less likely to reinterpret their regulation without careful
consideration that a court might reject that new interpretation. This factor
would thus benefit both the public and the agency itself in its decisionmaking process.
c. The Format by Which the Agency Expresses Its Interpretation
The next factor a court would examine is the format of the agency’s
interpretation.
As Professor Anthony has observed, an agency’s
interpretation generally can be expressed in numerous forms.368
To the extent an agency’s interpretation of a regulation is expressed
formally (e.g., through a notice and comment procedure), this factor would
clearly militate in favor of deference to that interpretation. In fact, aware
of the importance of this consideration to whether it will receive deference,
an agency would have the opportunity to take steps to express the
interpretation in the most formal, practicable manner. This would promote
transparency in the administrative state because, for the most part, the
consistently applied administrative interpretation.” 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971).
363
Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe R.R. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973).
364
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012).
365
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993).
366
Although hers was not the prevailing view, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Gardebring v.
Jenkins explained that she would have rejected an agency’s interpretation under the Seminole Rock
standard because the agency had taken “two inconsistent positions” during the litigation. 485 U.S. 415,
432–33 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
367
Aprill, supra note 360, at 2113.
368
See supra text accompanying note 45.
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more formal the format of an interpretation, the more likely the agency will
have engaged in a thorough analysis of its interpretation. For instance,
unlike an interpretation set forth in an amicus brief (or for the first time
during an adjudication), formal documents, such as guidance manuals and
policy statements, are more likely to set forth a complete, reasoned, and
deliberate interpretation, even though they were not developed through
notice and comment procedures.
There are, of course, many more ways interpretations can be expressed
informally by an agency. And while it is unrealistic (and ill-advised) to
assess and compare the relative weight of each format here, one format is
worthy of mention. There is reason to suggest that courts should be wary
of deferring to agency interpretations that have been asserted during
litigation and especially those submitted through an amicus brief. By their
nature, these litigation positions generally do not carry with them the
weight and judgment typically associated with agency interpretations
expressed in other informal formats, and therefore should be entitled to less
weight during juridical review of the deference question.
For example, the Court in SmithKline Beecham reaffirmed its view
originally set forth in Bowen that it would refuse to defer interpretations
that were mere post hoc rationalizations by the agency.369 In particular, the
Court warned that “[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an
agency’s convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”370
Relatedly, the consideration of this factor would help ensure that the
interpretation reflects “the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the
matter in question.”371 And a prime indicator of whether an interpretation
is an agency’s “fair and considered judgment” would include the format by
which the agency sets forth its interpretation.372 Thus, a renewed and more
meaningful consideration of whether an agency’s view is a mere litigating
position or post hoc rationalization would lead to more reasoned
369
SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
212 (1988). I recognize that the Court would have to retreat from its view that briefs, such as amicus
briefs, that set forth an interpretation for the very first time, should receive Seminole Rock deference.
See Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 881 (2011) (deferring to an interpretation
presented in an amicus brief when there is no reason to scrutinize the brief as a “post hoc
rationalization”).
370
Bowen, 488 U.S. at 213.
371
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav.
& Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 296 n.7 (2009) (rejecting the notion that “the fact that the interpretation is
stated in a legal brief make[s] it unworthy of deference”).
372
Therefore, an analysis of the format also dovetails with an analysis of the consistency of the
agency’s interpretation. For instance, a district court has noted that “[a]n agency may revise or alter its
interpretation over time, but this revised interpretation may be entitled to less deference than a position
consistently held, particularly when the agency does not provide a reasoned analysis for the revision.”
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:05-0784, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97432,
at *32 (S.D. W. Va. June 13, 2007) (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417
(1993)).
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interpretations.
This is not to say that the agency cannot issue an interpretation without
going through a notice and comment process.373 If the agency does not do
so, it may utilize the “interpretative rules” exemption found in section 553
of the APA.374 By proceeding in this manner, the interpretation would not
be subject to more involved APA procedures. At the same time, however,
the agency’s interpretation would be subject to increased scrutiny by the
court.375
d. Whether the Regulation Merely Repeats Statutory Language
The final factor that courts would consider is whether the regulation
that the agency purports to interpret merely restates or “parrots” the
statutory language.
In these instances, the agency’s proffered
interpretation is not actually an interpretation of the regulation. Rather, it
is actually the agency’s interpretation of the statutory language.
In light of the recent decisions in Mead and Christensen, there is a
legitimate concern that the agency might attempt to use its interpretation of
its regulation as a subterfuge for interpreting the statute to gain a more
deferential standard. Under these decisions, informal interpretations of
statutes are no longer interpreted under Chevron’s highly deferential
standard.376 Instead, they are to be reviewed under Skidmore’s less
deferential standard. An agency thus could gain a “deferential advantage”
if it were to succeed in having its informal interpretation of a regulation
that mirrors the statutory language reviewed under Seminole Rock, rather
than Skidmore.377 Following the general maxim that “what cannot be done
373
See Asimow & Anthony, supra note 358, at 17 (“[A] changed agency interpretation of a
regulation need not be promulgated by notice and comment, but can be attacked for failure to supply an
adequate explanation or on grounds of incorrectness.”).
374
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
375
As Professors Asimow and Anthony persuasively argue:

The agency should bear responsibility for the clarity of its regulations, which are
legislative acts objectively put forth for all to see and to interpret by their lights. An
agency interpretation should of course get fair judicial consideration. But a private
party ought to be able to derive its own interpretation and argue it to the court,
without being automatically trumped by the agency’s (often self-serving)
interpretation.
Asimow & Anthony, supra note 358, at 17. This would ensure consistency with the “[t]he manifest
purpose of APA § 706, which mandates that ‘the reviewing court . . . shall determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action,’ is to give affected persons recourse to an independent
judicial interpreter.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
376
See cases cited supra note 90.
377
See Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 11 (“Canny agency counsel might evade
Christensen’s rule denying strong deference to informal agency interpretations of statutes, by crafting
informal interpretive documents that purport to interpret regulations rather than the governing statute.
In this way an informally-issued agency position could command deference under Auer-Seminole Rock
where it could not get deference under Chevron.”). Indeed, that is precisely what the United States
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directly also cannot be done indirectly,” when a court concludes that a
regulation is merely “parroting” the statutory language, it should decline to
apply Seminole Rock deference to the agency’s interpretation.
Irrespective of an agency’s attempt to game the system, more
fundamentally, as the Court observed in Gonzales v. Oregon, “[a]n agency
does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead
of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has
elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”378 Inclusion of this
factor in this new approach would therefore screen out those situations and
have the added benefit of bringing some consistency to this area of law.
C. Applying the New Approach
With these factors in place, the question remains how to apply the
approach in practice. Although I do not propose a specific method for
making the final determination, such as weighing one factor more than
another, it should be fairly apparent whether a court should defer to the
agency’s interpretation once each factor is explored.
To be sure, this ultimate balancing of the factors does require, to some
degree, a subjective determination of whether to accept an agency’s
interpretation. But such subjectivity is present even in highly deferential
standards such as Chevron’s controlling deference test. For example, in
Chevron, courts must determine whether the statutory language is
ambiguous and then whether the interpretation is “reasonable.”379
Any subjectivity inherent in the test proposed above is far less
subjective than Skidmore’s test. For instance, contrary to Skidmore, the
factors of the proposed test do not call for a weighing of the merits of the
agency’s interpretation. Under Skidmore, courts weigh an interpretation
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.”380 Principal among these is the court’s assessment of the
“validity” of the agency’s interpretation. Therefore, despite the presence
of the other factors, the determination of whether to defer often rests on
whether the court subjectively believes that the agency’s view is valid.
Viewed in this light, an analysis of the factors proposed above allows
much less room for variation because, as a general matter, each of the
attempted to do in Christensen. Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); see also
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (“The Government first argues that the Interpretive Rule
is an elaboration of one of the Attorney General’s own regulations . . . . [and therefore] is entitled to
considerable deference in accordance with Auer.”).
378
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 244.
379
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
380
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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factors calls for an objective answer. For instance, most of them often call
for a simple “yes” or “no” answer: Did the agency state a contrary intent
that it is proposing now? Does the current interpretation conflict with its
past interpretation? Does the regulation merely parrot the statutory
language? Although a court is left to determine whether the factors compel
the conclusion that it should accept the agency’s interpretation, such a
determination mostly weighs on objective criteria.381
Therefore, by relying upon objective factors, thereby limiting the
subjective inquiry, and erring in a sense to deference, the new approach
proposed herein falls comfortably between Chevron’s controlling
deference and Skidmore’s less deferential treatment that the courts apply
when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision. Such
an approach would enable the Court to refine the deference regime to
achieve better workability, greater fairness, transparency, and increased
public participation, without overruling the Seminole Rock decision
altogether. It would also “respect the agency’s expertise, but preserve[] for
the courts their traditional power of interpretation where the agency has not
promulgated its position by exercise of delegated legislative power.”382
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, I believe adoption of this new approach will be effective at
taking the courts, the public, and administrative agencies out from their
respective “rock and a hard place.”383 Courts, for instance, have been
understandably hesitant to give controlling deference to agencies (e.g.,
Seminole Rock and Chevron) in interpretive cases because it may constitute
an abdication of the judicial role. On the other hand, courts have also been
concerned about withholding the proper amount of deference agencies
381
Even the factor that calls for courts to look at the format by which the interpretation is set forth
can be viewed objectively. As noted above, an interpretation expressed in myriad ways: manuals, court
briefs, interpretive rules, policy statements, opinion letters, correspondence, guidelines, press releases,
testimony before Congress, internal memoranda, speeches, the preamble of the final rule. These can be
generally classified according to their indicia of reliability. See supra Part V.B.2.c.
382
Anthony & Asimow, supra note 6, at 21.
383
I use the phrase “between a rock and a hard place” to represent a dilemma or position where
there are two largely unsatisfactory choices. Although this term is believed to have originated in the
United States, it is closely related to the Greek mythological choice sailors had to face when navigating
a course that would bring them into close proximity to two sea monsters, Scylla and Charybdis. As
described by Homer in The Odyssey, avoiding one meant approaching too closely to the other, with
either option having dire consequences. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 274–75 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin
Books 1996). The earliest known printed reference in the U.S. is reported to be in the “Dialect Notes
V” published by the American Dialect Society in 1921. Between a Rock and a Hard Place, KNOW
YOUR
PHRASE,
http://www.knowyourphrase.com/phrase-meanings/Between-Rock-and-HardPlace.html (last visited on Aug. 25, 2013). Some suggest that it stems from the illegal “Bisbee
Deportations incident of 1917” in which miners at the Copper Queen Mining Company in Bisbee,
Arizona, were forced to choose between harsh labor conditions (at the rock-face) or deportation and
likely unemployment and poverty (a hard place). Id.
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deserve (e.g., Skidmore) because doing so may improperly shift the
regulatory burden and policy-making choices to the courts. Given the
uncertainty in this area of the law generally, and the doctrinal confusion
with respect to Seminole Rock specifically, agencies, for their part, are
often caught between deciding whether to interpret a regulation informally,
or engage in a more costly and time consuming procedure involving the
notice and comment procedure of the APA. It thus seems clear that both
agencies and courts would benefit from a clearly articulated and more
balanced standard to look to when undertaking their respective roles in the
legal and administrative processes.
And the same can be said with respect to the public, and, by extension,
regulated industries. With this new approach, an administrative agency
would have a diminished incentive to promulgate vague regulations
(thereby limiting its broad leeway to interpret them in the future), and a
diminished opportunity to re-interpret a regulation routinely without
adequate notice. The new approach outlined herein would promote muchneeded certainty for the public. At the same time, it would protect some of
the much-needed deference and flexibility that the public expects to be
given to the expert and experienced administrative agency responsible for
administering the statute. The approach consequently has the effect of
freeing the public and industry from facing two unsatisfactory scenarios—
too much deference to the agency, creating regulatory uncertainty, and too
little deference, creating administrative inflexibility.

